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Abstract:  
When a plaintiff files a civil lawsuit in federal court, her complaint must satisfy certain 
minimum standards.  Specifically, under the prevailing understanding of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face, rather than mere conclusory statements tracking the elements of a cause of 
action.  Given the infinitely higher stakes involved in criminal cases, one might think that at least 
as robust a requirement would exist in that context.  But, in fact, a weaker pleading standard reigns.  
Under the governing interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), indictments that 
simply parrot the language of a statute are often sufficient.  
As this Article shows, however, that dichotomy between civil and criminal pleading 
standards is not justified.  The drafters of Rule 7(c) intended the Rule to be at least as stringent as 
Rule 8(a), as demonstrated by the text of Rules 7(c) and 8(a), the history of pleading in the United 
States, the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c), and the drafting history of the Criminal 
Rules.  And, the drafters’ original design should control how Rule 7(c) is interpreted today, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of Rule 8(a) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.  All of that means that our current pleading “balance” is really an 
erroneous imbalance that should be adjusted by those with the authority to do so, that criminal 
defendants should be entitled to much more information about their cases at the pleading stage and 
have a much stronger mechanism for challenging the case against them before trial than decisional 
law requires, and that debates over what the criminal pleading standard should be are being fought 
in the wrong posture. 
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I. Introduction 
When a plaintiff files a civil lawsuit in federal court, her complaint must satisfy certain 
minimum standards.  Specifically, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 
which has been interpreted to mean “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face’” and not “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”1  If the plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply 
with those requirements, the defendant may move to dismiss it, bringing an early end to the case. 
Given the infinitely higher stakes involved in criminal cases,2 one might think that a 
stronger pleading standard would exist in that context.  But, in fact, the opposite is true.  Under the 
prevailing interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)—which, by its terms, requires 
that an indictment contain “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged”3—indictments parroting the language of a statute are often 
sufficient.4  Consequently, allegations that would never sustain a civil complaint are frequently 
deemed adequate to allow a prosecution to proceed to trial.5  As one court put it well: 
 
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 
2 See James M. Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss Indictments?, 18 Green Bag 2d 347, 354, 357–58 (2015); Russell 
M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1644 (2017); Robert L. Weinberg, Applying the 
Rationale of Twombly to Provide Safeguards for the Accused in Federal Criminal Cases, 7 Advance 45, 51 (2013) 
[hereinafter Weinberg, Applying Twombly]; Robert L. Weinberg, Iqbal for the Accused?, 34 The Champion 28, 31 
(2010) [hereinafter Weinberg, Iqbal]. 
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, No. CR-17-68-GF, 2019 WL 1770108, at *10–11 (D. Mont. Apr. 16, 2019) 
(“Between on or about January 2015 and October 2105 [sic], in Cascade County in the State and District of Montana 
and elsewhere, the defendant, BRANDON CORDELL BENNETT, did employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and 
coerce and attempt to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice and coerce any minor, Jane Doe, who is known to the 
defendant but whose name is withheld to protect her identity, to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose 
of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, using materials that have been mailed, shipped, and transported in 
and affecting interstate and foreign commerce by any means, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).” (citation omitted)); 
United States v. Focia, No. 2:15cr17, 2015 WL 3672382, at *2–3 (M.D. Ala. June 12, 2015) (“On or about January 5, 
2015, in Montgomery County, within the Middle District of Alabama, the defendant, MICHAEL ALBERT FOCIA, 
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[A] civil complaint that merely recited the elements of the claims asserted and the 
approximate time and place that the claims arose would be summarily dismissed, 
for as the Supreme Court has explained, “a pleading that offers ‘labels and 
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.’”  But under controlling precedent, a criminal indictment need contain no more 
than this.6 
 
That interpretation of Rule 7(c), moreover, is firmly established.  It was set by no less an 
authority than the Supreme Court.7  Furthermore, under the shadow of that authority, lower courts 
have consistently rebuffed attempts to strengthen the criminal pleading standard.8  And, the 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules rejected a 2016 proposal to clarify that indictments should 
be subject to the same pleading requirements as civil complaints.9 
Commentators have taken notice of the dichotomy between our civil and criminal pleading 
standards and started to present arguments as to why that dichotomy is inappropriate, why the 
criminal pleading standard should be aligned with the civil standard, and why the criminal pleading 
standard ended up being as forgiving as it is.10  More importantly, however, they have begun to 
make textual and historical claims indicating that Rule 7(c) should be interpreted differently.  For 
 
did willfully and maliciously injure and destroy the works, property, and material of a radio system, operated and 
controlled by the United States and used and intended to be used for military and civil defense functions of the United 
States, and did willfully and maliciously interfere with the working and use of such system, and willfully and 
maliciously obstruct, hinder, and delay the transmission of a communication over such system, specifically, by 
interfering with law enforcement communications over such system, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 1362.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Guler, No. 1:07CV130, 2007 WL 4593504, at *3, 5 (E.D. Mo. 
Dec. 21, 2007) (“On or about the 13th day of July, 2007, in Shannon County, within the Eastern District of Missouri, 
the defendant, KARRIE L. GULER, knowingly did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, and interfere 
with Teresa McKinney, a Ranger with the National Park Service, while she was engaged in her official duties, in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 111.”). 
6 United States v. Hansen, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2019 WL 7049954, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2019) (citation omitted). 
7 Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 109–10. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013). 
9 Minutes, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 19–21 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-04-18-minutes_-_criminal_rules_meeting_final_0.pdf; Letter from 
James M. Burnham to Hon. Donald W. Molloy, Chair, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/16-cr-a-suggestion_burnham_0.pdf. 
10 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 2, at 348–49; Gold et al., supra note 2, at 1612–13; Ion Meyn, The Haves of 
Procedure, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1765, 1770–73, 1804–12 (2019) [hereinafter Meyn, The Haves]; Ion Meyn, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 39, 40–41, 55–57 (2014) [hereinafter Meyn, 
Unbearable Lightness]; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 2, at 49, 53; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 2, at 29–
32. 
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example, some have suggested that Rule 7(c) requires more factual specificity than Rule 8(a) 
because Rule 7(c) refers to pleading “facts,” whereas Rule 8(a) does not.11  Likewise, and relatedly, 
some have begun to observe that the drafters of Rule 8(a) eliminated references to pleading “facts” 
that appeared in pre-Federal Rules civil pleading codes and that Rule 7(c)’s language is comparable 
to those codes.12  Additionally, at least one commentator has noted that the original Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 7(c) includes cross-references to Rule 8.13  Finally, another scholar has 
engaged in a pioneering exploration of the drafting history of the Criminal Rules and, in doing so, 
has indicated that the drafters of Rule 7(c) adopted the pleading standard of the Civil Rules.14 
The textual and historical claims raised in the literature are powerful and suggest that Rule 
7(c) should be understood differently than it is today.  But, scholarship on this subject is in nascent 
and underdeveloped form, and no commentator has performed an in-depth, holistic, thorough, and 
accurate analysis of the sources relevant to the meaning of Rule 7(c) in order to firmly establish 
how that Rule should be interpreted.  This Article fills that gap.  It reveals—in line with the 
burgeoning commentary in this area—that Rule 7(c) was originally intended to be at least as 
rigorous as Rule 8(a) and should be so construed today. 
That finding is an important one.  First of all, it demonstrates that our well-established 
approach to criminal pleading is actually unjustified and should be changed by those with the 
authority to do so.  Furthermore, it shows that criminal defendants should receive much more 
information about their cases at the pleading stage and possess a much more robust mechanism for 
 
11 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 19.1(d) n.41 (4th ed. 2019); Meyn, The Haves, supra note 10, at 1809; 
Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 2, at 49; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 2, at 29; Jenike-Godshalk, Comment, 
“Plausible Cause”?: How Criminal Procedure Can Illuminate the U.S. Supreme Court’s New General Pleading 
Standard in Civil Suits, U. Cin. L. Rev. 791, 806 (2010). 
12 LaFave, supra note 11, § 19.1(d) & n.41; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 2, at 49; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra 
note 2, at 29. 
13 Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 11, at 806 & n.128. 
14 Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are so Different: A Forgotten History, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 697, 
715–16 (2017). 
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challenging prosecutions before trial than decisional law requires.15  And, it makes clear that 
debates over the criminal pleading standard are being fought in entirely the wrong posture.  
Defenders of the present standard should have to justify why that standard is appropriate 
notwithstanding that Rule 7(c) is best interpreted as at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), rather than 
being in the position to reject efforts to alter it. 
This Article, however, is not a policy-oriented one.  It is not geared, as much of the 
literature on this subject has been, towards arguing that raising the criminal pleading standard is a 
“good” idea or that doing so could be justified on grounds similar to those that have been invoked 
to strengthen pleading standards in other contexts—although such arguments are far from weak.16  
Rather, it is focused on ascertaining the meaning and proper interpretation of Rule 7(c).  That scope 
has been chosen because, in the author’s view, any debate over what we might like the law to be 
should be informed by a complete understanding of what the law actually is, and that understanding 
is presently lacking. 
The Article’s analysis proceeds as follows.  Part II describes the current state of the law, 
including an introduction to the prevailing civil and criminal pleading standards as well as an 
overview of recent efforts to alter the criminal standard.  Part III sets out the Article’s argument as 
to why Rule 7(c) should be interpreted to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a).  Part IV then engages 
with a host of counterarguments.  Part V concludes. 
 
 
 
15 Cf., e.g., Burnham, supra note 2, at 348–49, 351, 354–57; Gold et al., supra note 2, at 1612–13, 1632–33, 1640–
44; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 2, at 51–52; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
16 See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 2, at 348–54, 357–62; Gold et al., supra note 2, at 1612–13, 1632–33, 1640–44; 
Meyn, Unbearable Lightness, supra note 10, at 55–57; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 2, at 48–52; 
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 2, at 29–32. 
5 
 
II. The Federal Civil and Criminal Pleading Standards 
Before exploring the proper interpretation of Rule 7(c), it is first necessary to understand 
the state of the law today.  Consequently, this Part discusses the prevailing civil and criminal 
pleading standards, as well as recent attempts to strengthen the criminal standard. 
 A. The Civil Pleading Standard 
As set out above, a plaintiff begins a civil action in federal court by filing a complaint, 
which lays out the substance of her claim for relief.17  That document must meet certain minimum 
standards.18  Those standards are established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which says 
that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”19  If the complaint fails to satisfy that Rule, 
the defendant can move to dismiss it for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), thereby requiring the plaintiff to file a new complaint or terminating the 
action.20 
For much of Rule 8(a)’s history, the civil pleading standard was governed by the Supreme 
Court’s 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson.21  There, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a) to mean that 
“a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”22  It made clear that Rule 8(a) does “not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim” but rather just “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give 
 
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, 8(a). 
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007); Ríos-Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Commerce, 927 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2019); O’Boyle v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 346–47 (7th 
Cir. 2018). 
21 See 355 U.S. 41, 45–48 (1957). 
22 Id. at 45–46. 
6 
 
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”23  In 
short, the Court largely rejected “a call for the pleading of specific facts.”24  And, many courts read 
that decision to mean that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to 
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 
‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery” or that “any statement revealing the theory of the 
claim w[ould] suffice unless its factual impossibility [were] shown from the face of the 
pleadings.”25   
The Conley pleading standard, however, did not last.  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
the Supreme Court forced the “no set of facts” language into retirement.26  It concluded that that 
language could be, and had been, read too narrowly, that the import of Conley had been 
misunderstood, and that a literal understanding of Conley had been rejected by courts and 
commentators alike.27  Thus, it said, Conley’s “no set of facts” language “is best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated 
 
23 Id. at 47 (citation omitted). 
24 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, 105 (2008); see 
also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (“[S]implified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for 
discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim 
and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle 
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”); cf. Has the Supreme Court Limited 
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112d Cong. 5–6 (2012) [hereinafter 
Access to Courts Hearing] (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (“[A] number 
of Supreme Court decisions including . . . Conley v. Gibson, embraced the concept of ‘notice pleading,’ permitting 
plaintiffs to allege very little in their complaints, and that in general terms.” (citation omitted)). 
25 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–62 (2007) (first alteration in original); Am. Dental Ass’n v. 
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive 
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237, 2241 (1989); see also Kolupa v. Roselle 
Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is enough to name the plaintiff and the defendant, state the nature of 
the grievance, and give a few tidbits (such as the date) that will let the defendant investigate.”). 
26 550 U.S. at 561–63; accord Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 7 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); 
Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 Judicature 109, 113 (2009). 
27 550 U.S. at 561–63. 
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adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the 
complaint.”28 
The Twombly Court replaced Conley’s pleading standard with a requirement that a 
complaint contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” i.e., “to raise 
a right to relief above the speculative level.”29  It said that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”30  And, it rejected the view “that the 
Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether.”31  Rather, a more 
stringent standard was needed to “reflect[] the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain 
statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’” and “give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”32 
Shortly after Twombly, the Supreme Court further clarified its Rule 8(a) jurisprudence in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.33  Prior to Iqbal, some believed Twombly might be limited to certain contexts, 
such as antitrust (the type of claim in Twombly) or other sorts of cases that called for more rigor.34  
Iqbal, however, “made clear that [Twombly’s] approach applies across the board.”35 
Iqbal also elucidated how Rule 8(a) should be interpreted under Twombly.  The Court said 
that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces”—as construed by Twombly—“does not require 
 
28 Id. at 563. 
29 Id. at 555, 570. 
30 Id. at 555 (alteration in original). 
31 Id. at 555 n.3. 
32 Id. at 555, 557 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also id. at 555 n.3 (“While, for most types of 
cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome requirement that a claimant ‘set out in detail the facts upon which 
he bases his claim,’ Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” 
(citation omitted)).  
33 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009). 
34 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Starr v. County of Los Angeles, 659 F.3d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 
2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc); Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 8 
(statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 26, at 114. 
35 Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 26, at 115; 
accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684; Starr, 659 F.3d at 852 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
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‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation,” “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” or 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements.”36  Indeed, it maintained, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the 
hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery 
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”37  It additionally explained that, in 
deciding a motion to dismiss, courts should functionally ignore allegations that “are no more than 
conclusions” by refusing to “assume their veracity,” in contrast to “well-pleaded factual 
allegations,” which should be taken as true and evaluated to “determine whether they plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief.”38  Finally, the Court said that “[a] claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”39 
 In sum, under the prevailing civil pleading regime, legal conclusions—e.g., allegations 
merely tracking the language of a cause of action—cannot satisfy Rule 8(a).  Rather, factual 
allegations sufficient to plausibly warrant relief are necessary. 
 B. The Criminal Pleading Standard 
The initiation of a federal criminal prosecution is more complex than that of a standard 
civil lawsuit.  But, the pleading process is analogous.40  Often after several preliminary steps,41 the 
government files a “pleading . . . initiat[ing] the formal charge against the accused,” which, in 
 
36 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 678–79. 
38 Id. at 679. 
39 Id. at 678. 
40 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to “Plead Out” Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: 
The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal Protection, 40 Emory 
L.J. 341, 353 (1991). 
41 See 1 Andrew D. Leipold, Fed. Practice & Proc. Crim. §§ 41, 71, 91, 121, 161 (4th ed. 2019). 
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felony prosecutions, is termed an indictment or information.42  That pleading, similar to a civil 
complaint, must satisfy certain requirements.  Specifically, under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 7(c), the “[t]he indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”43  If an indictment or information 
fails to satisfy Rule 7(c), the defendant may move to dismiss it for “failure to state an offense” 
under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v).44  That would require the government to file a new pleading or 
terminate the prosecution.45 
The Supreme Court’s criminal pleading jurisprudence has not shifted as markedly as its 
civil pleading jurisprudence, so we can begin with the Court’s most recent decision interpreting 
Rule 7(c), United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, issued in 2007.46  The question the Court decided was 
whether an indictment for attempted unlawful reentry was defective if it failed to allege “‘any 
specific overt act that is a substantial step’ toward the completion of the unlawful reentry” and, 
instead, simply stated that the defendant “attempted” to reenter the United States at a particular 
time and place.47  It held that such an indictment was not defective.48 
In reaching that decision, the Court made several points relating to the criminal pleading 
standard.  Specifically, it said that “an indictment parroting the language of a federal criminal 
statute is often sufficient.”49  Additionally, as to Rule 7(c) itself, the Court explained: 
 
42 Id. § 121.  “An indictment is a criminal charge returned to the court by a grand jury,” whereas “[a]n information is 
a criminal charge prepared by the prosecutor that has not been subject to grand jury review.”  Id. 
43 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). 
44 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v); United States v. Carter, 465 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 2006).  
45 See United States v. Slough, 679 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2010). 
46 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007); see, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (reaching a similar 
conclusion to Resendiz-Ponce); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1953) (same). 
47 Resendiz-Ponce, 49 U.S. at 104–05, 107 (citation omitted). 
48 Id. at 107, 111. 
49 Id. at 109.  The Court acknowledged that “there are crimes that must be charged with greater specificity,” but it 
treated that exception as a narrow one applicable only in unique circumstances—not there present—where guilt turns 
“crucially upon . . . a specific identification of fact.”  Id. at 110 (citation omitted). 
10 
 
[T]he Federal Rules “were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal 
pleadings and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure.”  While detailed 
allegations might well have been required under common-law pleading rules, they 
surely are not contemplated by Rule 7(c)(1), which provides that an indictment 
“shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged.”50 
 
 In sum, unlike in the civil context, an indictment that is largely conclusory and just tracks 
the language of a statute is adequate under the Federal Rules.51  And, because of that, pleadings 
that would certainly fail as civil complaints are often deemed sufficient as indictments.52 
 C. Attempts to Raise the Criminal Pleading Standard 
 Resendiz-Ponce was decided months before Twombly and years before Iqbal.53  As a result 
of those latter decisions, then, there have been numerous attempts to align the criminal and civil 
pleading standards.  All have been unsuccessful. 
 Most of those efforts have been by way of litigation.  Criminal defendants have repeatedly 
argued that indictments should have to comply with Twombly and Iqbal.54  Lower courts have 
generally rejected those arguments on the grounds that binding decisional law holds to the contrary 
and that there is no authority supporting a heightened criminal pleading standard.55  Those courts, 
 
50 Id. (citations omitted). 
51 Id. at 107–09. 
52 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
53 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 662 (2009) (decided May 18, 2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 544 (2007) (decided May 21, 2007); Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 102 (decided January 9, 2007). 
54 See, e.g., United States v. Gerebizza, 720 F. App’x 302, 305 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 
918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hansen, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2019 WL 7049954, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 
2019); United States v. Adcox, No. CR 15-36, 2017 WL 2489998, at *4 (W.D. La. June 7, 2017); United States v. 
Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-46, 2017 WL 387204, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2017), adopted by amended order, 2018 WL 523352, 
at *1 (Jan. 23, 2018); United States v. Coley, No. CR415-187, 2016 WL 743432, at *1–3 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2016), 
adopted, 2016 WL 1032876, at *1 (Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Hossain, No. 2:13-cr-119, 2014 WL 4354121, at 
*3 n.1 (D. Nev. June 23, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL 4354125, at *1–2, 4 (Sept. 2, 2014); United States v. Calvente, 
No. S3 12 Cr. 732, 2013 WL 4038952, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2013); United States v. Castillo Madrigal, No. 12-
cr-62, 2013 WL 12099089, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 28, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 12099088 (Feb. 21, 2013); United 
States v. Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Mensah, No. 12-cr-71, 2012 WL 
2466393, at *2 (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2012); United States v. Lockhart, 11-cr-90, 2012 WL 12888034, at *1–2 (W.D. 
Wis. Jan. 17, 2012); United States v. Northcutt, No. 07-60220-CR, 2008 WL 162753, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008). 
55 See, e.g., Gerebizza, 720 F. App’x at 305; Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926; Hansen, 2019 WL 7049954, at *2–3; Adcox, 
2017 WL 2489998, at *4; Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *2; Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *1–2; Calvente, 
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however, have also raised substantive legal arguments against amplifying the criminal pleading 
standard, including: (1) that nothing in Twombly or Iqbal suggests that those decisions were 
intended to apply to criminal cases;56 (2) that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of an 
indictment must establish prejudice to prevail;57 (3) that a defendant who wants more detail about 
his case may seek a bill of particulars;58 (4) that Rule 8(a) requires a “showing” that the pleader is 
entitled to relief, whereas Rule 7(c) does not;59 (5) that the Criminal Rules were designed to 
eliminate technicalities, ensure procedural simplicity, and reduce detailed allegations;60 and (6) 
that criminal and civil procedure are just different, regarding, for example, the protections 
defendants receive and the burdens of moving past the pleadings into discovery.61  
 Another attempt at altering the criminal pleading standard involved a proposal to the 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.62  In 2016, James Burnham submitted a formal 
recommendation to the Advisory Committee that “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(3)(B)(v)—governing dismissal of an indictment for failure to state an offense” be altered “to 
 
2013 WL 4038952, at *2 n.1; Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 164; Mensah, 2012 WL 2466393, at *2; Lockhart, 2012 
WL 12888034, at *1–2; Northcutt, 2008 WL 162753, at *2. 
56 Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *1–2; Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *1. 
57 Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *2. 
58 Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926. 
59 Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *2–3. 
60 Id. at *1 & n.2; see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 110 (2007) (making the same point). 
61 United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-46, 2017 WL 
387204, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2017); Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3; Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *2. 
62 The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules is the main rulemaking body for the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  That Committee is accountable to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which is 
overseen by the Judicial Conference of the United States and which ultimately makes recommendations to the 
Supreme Court.  Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
Procedural Efficacy, 87 Geo. L.J. 887, 892 (1999).  Rules are developed as follows: “A proposed rule is first 
considered by the Advisory Committee.  If the Advisory Committee approves the proposal, it is then reviewed by the 
Standing Committee and finally by the Judicial Conference before being forwarded to the Supreme Court.  If the 
Supreme Court concurs, the proposal is transmitted to Congress, which then has roughly seven months to exercise a 
veto.  In the absence of a veto, the proposed rule goes into effect.”  Id.; see also U.S. Courts, How the Rulemaking 
Process Works, https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works 
(providing a similar overview of the rulemaking process). 
 The rulemaking process has changed over time.  For example, the Advisory Committee originally reported 
to the Supreme Court directly.  Preface to 1 Drafting History of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure xi–xvi 
(Madeleine J. Wilkin & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter Drafting History]. 
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clarify that the standard for dismissal of a criminal indictment is meant to be consistent with the 
standard for dismissal of a civil complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”63   
 When the Committee took up the proposal, a number of members expressed interest.64  
Nevertheless, several  legal arguments were raised against it, including: (1) that criminal pleading 
practices are set by court decisions that uphold bare-bones indictments; (2) “that minimal pleading 
in criminal cases is hundreds of years old, not something new,” and that the proposal seemed like 
a “return to the old common law pleading rules”; and (3) that “the proposal seeks to create new 
substantive rights, which is beyond the authority of the Rules Committee.”65  After brief 
discussion, the Chairman summarily quashed the measure by “announc[ing] that he did not intend 
to set up a Subcommittee to pursue” it.66 
III. Rule 7(c) Should Be Interpreted to Be at Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a) 
 
 The current pleading regime subjects indictments to much lighter scrutiny than civil 
complaints.  And, that regime is deeply entrenched, supported, as it is, by Supreme Court decisions, 
lower courts, and the Advisory Committee.  Nevertheless, it is unjustified: the drafters of Rule 7(c) 
fashioned the Rule to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), and that original design should govern 
our interpretation of Rule 7(c) today.  This Part explains why. 
 A. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Be at Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a) 
 
When the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules assembled in the mid-1940s to design a 
new set of criminal procedure rules for the federal courts, it could have created any system it 
 
63 Letter from James M. Burnham to Hon. Donald W. Molloy, supra note 9. 
64 Minutes, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 19–21 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-04-18-minutes_-_criminal_rules_meeting_final_0.pdf. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 21. 
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thought prudent—within statutory and constitutional limits.  Notwithstanding that range of choice, 
however, the drafters crafted Rule 7(c) to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a). 
The literature has begun to highlight some of the sources that are suggestive of that fact.67  
But, to fully understand Rule 7(c)’s original design, it is necessary to consider the sources 
holistically and examine them thoroughly.  Thus, this Section first offers a detailed description of 
(and some observations about) the relevant sources—the text of Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a), the history 
of pleading in the United States, the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c), and the 
drafting history of the Criminal Rules—and then analyzes their meaning and implications for Rule 
7(c) as a cohesive whole. 
  i. The Sources Relevant to the Meaning of Rule 7(c) 
 
1. The Text of Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) 
 
To understand Rule 7(c), the first source to consider is the text of Rule 7(c) and its civil 
counterpart, Rule 8(a).  Rule 7(c) provides that “[t]he indictment or information must be a plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”68  
And, Rule 8(a) states that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”69   
Those provisions will be analyzed below, but it is important to highlight two key points at 
this juncture.  First, Rule 7(c) requires pleading “essential facts,” but Rule 8(a) makes no reference 
to facts whatsoever.  Second, both Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) read effectively the same today as they 
did when originally adopted.70 
 
67 See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text; see infra note 204. 
68 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). 
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
70 See Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (2019) (“The indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (1946) (“The 
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2. The History of Pleading 
The next source to consider is the history of pleading in the United States.  This Section 
first describes the history of civil pleading, then discusses the history of criminal pleading, and 
finally explains the historical relationship between civil and criminal pleading rules. 
a. Civil Pleading 
The history of American civil pleading begins with the common law.71  At common law, 
the ultimate objective of pleading was to narrow the issues for trial.72  To facilitate that narrowing, 
and for a host of other reasons, “highly technical rules” developed that, for centuries, elevated 
pleading to the status of “a science to be formulated and cultivated.”73  As one 19th-century treatise 
explained: 
[Common law pleading was characterized by] the extreme nicety, precision, and 
accuracy which were demanded by the courts in the framing of allegations, in 
averring either the facts from which the primary rights of the parties arose, or those 
which constituted the breach of such rights, in the use of technical phrases and 
formulas, in the certainty of statement produced by negativing almost all possible 
conclusions different from that affirmed by the pleader, in the numerous repetitions 
of the same averment, and finally in the invention and employment of a language 
and mode of expression utterly unlike the ordinary spoken or written English, and 
meaningless to any person but a trained expert.74 
 
 
indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2019) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1938) (“A 
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”). 
71 See James V. Bilek, Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c): Assessing the Proper Standard to Apply to Affirmative Defenses, 
15 Chapman L. Rev. 377, 379–80 (2011). 
72 Charles E. Clark, Clark on Code Pleading 12–13 (2d ed. 1947); Bilek, supra note 71, at 378–81. 
73 Clark, supra note 72, at 12–15; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World 
of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1107, 
1112–13 (2010). 
74 John Norton Pomeroy, Code Remedies: Remedies and Remedial Rights by the Civil Action According to the 
Reformed American Procedure – A Treatise Adapted to Use in All the States and Territories Where that System 
Prevails § 403 (1875). 
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Furthermore, although it was frequently said that parties were to plead “the material, issuable facts 
constituting the cause of action,”75 the common law often actually required alleging fictions, 
conclusions, and generalities.76  Put another way, “common law pleading [came] in large measure 
to consist of formal general statements which did not set forth the details of the pleader’s case.”77  
Frustrations with those and other aspects of common law pleading ultimately led to a desire 
for reform.78  In the United States, that desire culminated in a new code of procedure in New 
York—termed the “Field Code” because it “was in large measure the work of David Dudley 
Field”—and the idea of “code pleading” spread widely to other American jurisdictions.79 
The codes ushered in numerous paradigm-shifting changes, but one of the most important 
was that they replaced the technical, complex, and opaque common law system of “issue pleading” 
with “fact-pleading,” under which pleadings were just to state the actual ultimate facts and not 
evidence or legal conclusions.80  As one prominent treatise-writer put it, under the codes, only 
“dry, naked, actual facts” should be pleaded, and “[e]very attempt to combine fact and law, to give 
the facts a legal coloring and aspect, to present them in their bearing upon the issues rather than in 
 
75 Id. § 402. 
76 Id. §§ 404–05; accord Clark, supra note 72, at 225; Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale 
L.J. 259, 259, 261–62 (1926); James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and 
Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 1257, 1274 
(2010); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 520 (1957). 
77 Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L.J. 259, 259, 261–62 (1926).  
78 See Arphaxed Loomis et al., First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, Leg. 71, 1st Sess., § 118 
cmt. (N.Y. 1848); Clark, supra note 72, at 17, 21–22, 225; Bilek, supra note 71, at 379–81; Clark, supra note 76, at 
259; Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 1272–73; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1113–14. 
79 See Loomis et al., supra note 78, at § 118 cmt.; Clark, supra note 72, at 21–24; Bilek, supra note 71, at 381; Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1038 (1982); Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 1271, 
1273–74; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1114–17; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 76, at 520. 
80 See Clark, supra note 72, at 22–23, 225; Bilek, supra note 71, at 380–82; Clark, supra note 76, at 259–62; Maxeiner, 
supra note 76, at 1272–74; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1114. 
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their actual naked simplicity” would constitute “an averment of law instead of fact” and thus 
violate the principles of code pleading.81 
The reformers used very specific language to reflect their move to fact pleading.  The Field 
Code “required that the complaint contain ‘[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of 
action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.’”82  Similar language was adopted 
broadly by other code states.83 
The codes, however, faced their own problems.  For example, because they focused on 
pleading “facts,” there arose serious “practical difficult[ies] in distinguishing between allegations 
of ultimate fact . . . and legal conclusions,” which, in turn, resulted in much litigation and the 
resurgence of technicality.84  Commentators, accordingly, began to take issue with code pleading.  
For example, one writer lamented that code pleading “is a fruitful source of the delay in litigation 
which is so commonly condemned; it causes a great waste of time on the part of appellate courts; 
it no doubt wastes much time in the trial courts . . . ; and occasionally it leads to an improper 
conclusion of a particular litigation.”85  
 These state law developments impacted federal pleading.  Prior to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, law and equity remained divided in the federal courts.86  Equity was governed by 
 
81 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, § 423; Charles E. Clark, Pleading Negligence, 32 Yale L.J. 483, 484 (1923); Clark, 
supra note 76, at 261; David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of 
Law Reform, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 433, 476 (2010). 
82 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1115–16 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Marcus, supra note 
81, at 476 (same). 
83 Clark, supra note 72, at 225; Pomeroy, supra note 74, § 402, 411; Clark, supra note 76, at 259, 260 n.4, 261 n.11; 
Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441, 447 (2010). 
84 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1116; accord Clark, supra note 72, at 225–28; Bilek, supra note 71, at 381–
82 & n.31; Clark, supra note 81, at 484; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 438 (1986); Weinstein & Distler, supra note 76, at 520–21. 
85 Clarke B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 506 (1918). 
86 Clark, supra note 72, at 31. 
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the Federal Equity Rules, under which “the code system substantially prevailed.”87  And, “[f]or 
actions at law, Congress’s passage of the Conformity Act in 1872 required that federal district 
courts follow the procedure of the state in which the court sat, which varied between common law 
and code pleading.”88 
 Efforts at reforming federal civil procedure—a subject with a long and colorful history 
beyond the scope of discussion here—ultimately bore fruit in the 1930s.89  “In 1934, Congress 
enacted the Rules Enabling Act, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform rules 
governing practice and procedure in the federal courts.”90  The Supreme Court then quickly 
appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.91 
 The Advisory Committee, “[s]obered by the fate of the Field Code . . . set out to devise a 
procedural system . . . in which the preferred disposition [would be] on the merits, by jury trial, 
after full disclosure through discovery.”92  With respect to pleading, the drafters created—in Rule 
8(a)—what they viewed as “a very simple, concise system of allegation and defense” requiring 
only “very brief and direct allegations,” based on the philosophy that pleadings should “do little 
more than sketch the type of battle that is to follow.”93  And, they “studiously avoided using the 
 
87 Id.; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 F. 127, 137 (E.D. Mo. 1916); Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure Civil § 1218 (3d ed. 2019); Amber A. Pelot, Casenote, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere 
Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in Pleading?, 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (2008). 
88 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1117; Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 9 Nev. L.J. 10–11 (2008); see also Imre S. Szalai, An Obituary for the Federal Arbitration Act: An Older 
Cousin to Modern Civil Procedure, 2010 J. Disp. Resol. 391, 402–06 (2010) (describing the history of conformity 
procedures in the federal courts before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
89 See Burbank, supra note 79, at 1035–98 (offering a comprehensive history of the federal procedural reform 
movement). 
90 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 73, at 1117. 
91 Bone, supra note 62, at 894. 
92 Marcus, supra note 81, at 439. 
93 Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 551, 552 (1939); 
James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Geo. L. J. 
551, 559 (1937).   
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term[] ‘facts’ . . . which [gave] so much trouble in Code Pleading.”94  Rule 8(a) and the other Civil 
Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court in 1937 and went into effect in 1938.95,96 
 Not everyone was enamored of Rule 8(a)’s language, however.  For example, in the early 
1950s, the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit approved a resolution that Rule 8(a) should be 
amended to read—evoking the code pleading regime of days past—“substantially as 
follows: . . . ‘(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief, which statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action.’”97  The Conference 
did so, it appears, because it felt that Rule 8(a) had been too liberally construed and should make 
clear that “ultimate facts” must be pleaded.98  That proposal was rejected.99 
 
 
 
94 Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 Va. L. Rev. 261, 263 n.9 (1939); accord Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 
24, at 4–5, 12, 17 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 26, at 115, 117 & n.83; Marcus, supra note 
81, at 439; Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5, 12 (1938); Weinstein & Distler, supra 
note 76, at 522. 
95 See Fed. R. Civ. P. historical note. 
96 In designing Rule 8(a), its drafters did not entirely abandon history.  For example, they indicated that, in certain 
respects, the pleadings they anticipated would satisfy common law and code requirements.  See, e.g., Clark, supra 
note 93, at 565 (asserting that the model complaint for negligence contained in the Civil Rules, discussed infra at notes 
231–236 and their accompanying text, “would be good in at least most of the jurisdictions of the United States” and 
that other model forms were “really common law forms from the old action of assumpsit, including the common 
counts in assumpsit”).  In fact, the drafters of Rule 8(a) drew directly on the common law’s allowance of general 
averments.  See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L. Q. 297, 309, 316 (1938) (explaining that, 
under the common law, “in such usual cases as claims for debt or negligence a simple form of general allegation was 
permissible” and that “the model [of pleading under the Civil Rules was] the simple, direct, and rather general 
statement familiar to generations of lawyers by its use from common-law times to the present”); see also id. at 309 
(“[S]ome of the basic illustrative forms of pleading issued by the Court as an appendix to these new rules come directly 
from the common law.”).  Nevertheless, they made clear that “[t]he real test of a good pleading under the new rules is 
not . . . whether the allegations would be deemed good at common law” but rather “whether information is given 
sufficient to enable the party to plead and to prepare for trial.”  Sunderland, supra note 94, at 12; cf. Access to Courts 
Hearing, supra note 24, at 4 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (“[T]he committee wanted to escape the confinement 
of . . . common law procedure.”).  Indeed, Rule 8(a) was “designed to . . .  reduce the pleading requirements to a 
minimum,” “make[] pleadings relatively unimportant,” Moore, supra note 93, at 561, and impose “no fixed and certain 
rule as to the detail required,” Clark, supra, at 316–17.   
97 Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952). 
98 Id. at 264–65, 271–75. 
99 Twombly, 550 U.S. ay 582–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marcus, supra note 81, at 445. 
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b. Criminal Pleading 
The history of American criminal pleading also begins with the common law.  Under that 
system, criminal pleading was—like its civil counterpart—characterized by excessive technicality, 
intricacy, and formality, largely driven by the severity of punishments at common law.100  As one 
commentator explained in the 1920s: 
In the face of such atrocious severity of punishment one might well expect to find 
humane judges searching for technicalities merely to save miserable offenders from 
penalties which were outrageously excessive in particular cases.  This practice 
seems not to have been uncommon. . . . Unfortunately, however, every such 
decision became a precedent for all future cases, even after undue severity had been 
eliminated from the penal provisions and unreasonable harshness had been 
removed from the procedure itself.  For every defendant who had been saved from 
paying the death penalty for some trivial offense by legalistic acumen, there 
remained an additional word, clause or phrase which all future indictments for such 
offenses would have to contain.  More and more such pleadings became 
complicated and formidable.  These fossilized relics of the age of punitive savagery 
were brought over to this country.101 
 
Frustrations with common law criminal pleading—also like on the civil side—led to reform 
efforts.102  Consequently, during the 19th century, “many states began statutory reforms to relax 
certain common-law pleading requirements.”103  As part of that movement, several jurisdictions 
adopted code pleading-like rules to govern indictments.  They required, for example, that an 
 
100 See Robert I. Broussard, The Short Form Indictment History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 La. L. Rev. 78, 
78–79 (1944); Sam. B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past 
Fifty Years, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 583, 587 (1937); Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 29 A.B.A. J. 654, 655 
(1943); Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 119, 123, 3 F.R.D. 445, 
447 (1944); Imwinkelried, supra note 40, 355; George Z. Medalie, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 Lawyers 
Guild Rev. 1, 3 (1944); Arthur Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 A.B.A. J. 376, 376–77 
(1943). 
101 Rollin M. Perkins, Short Form Indictments and Informations, 15 A.B.A. J. 292, 292 (1929). 
102 See Meyn, supra note 14, at 702, 706. 
103 State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593,600 (N.C. 2003).  Many of these reforms occurred in the mid-1800s.  Id.; LaFave et 
al., supra note 11, § 19.1(b).  There were, however, earlier reforms.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peas, 43 Va. (2 
Gratt.) 629, 637 (1834); Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203, 218 (N.Y. 1831). 
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indictment contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the offense, in plain and concise 
language without unnecessary repetition.”104 
Those rules, however, also raised concerns.  For example, commentators noted that they 
“usually failed to accomplish their purpose, because they did not purport to change the underlying 
function of the indictment and did not suggest the exact wording to be used in certain cases,” 
meaning that “lawyers preferred to use language which had been held sufficient for the particular 
purpose, however verbose and archaic, rather than to venture the use of a new and untested 
terminology in a very formal instrument.”105  Others suggested that there was little difference 
between code and common law pleading106—and, indeed, the code pleading rules were 
linguistically similar to common law requirements.107 
Some reforms went further, however, and permitted so-called “short-form” indictments.108  
Such indictments were to include “an extremely truncated description of the criminal conduct” and 
then be supplemented by a bill of particulars or the like.109  For instance, the American Law 
 
104 State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1902); see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 308–09 (1900); 
Grattan v. State, 71 Ala. 344, 345–46 (1882); In re Mansfield, 39 P. 775, 777–78 (Cal. 1895); Madden v. State, 1 Kan. 
340, 348–49 (1863); State v. Hinckley, 4 Minn. 345, 357–58 (1860); People v. Laurence, 33 N.E. 547, 521 (N.Y. 
1893); State v. Wright, 37 P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1894). 
105 Perkins, supra note 101, at 293. 
106 See, e.g., Charles A. Willard, The Seventeenth Century Indictment in the Light of Modern Conditions, 24 Harv. L. 
Rev. 290, 293, 295 (1911); Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 New Criminal Procedure or New Commentaries on the Law of 
Pleading and Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases § 426 (1896). 
107 See, e.g., Floren v. United States, 186 F. 961, 962 (8th Cir. 1911); United States v. Burns, 54 F. 351, 361 (C.C.D. 
W. Va. 1893); Grattan, 71 Ala. at 345–46; Locke v. State, 3 Ga. 534, 538 (1847); People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311, 317 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Dord v. People, 9 Barb. 671, 675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); Scroter v. Harrington, 8 N.C. 192, 193 
(1820); Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98, 113 (Ohio 1857); Lamberton v. State, 11 Ohio 282, 284 (1842); Lewis v. State, 
50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 333, 336 (Tenn. 1871); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. 592, 595 (1867); State v. Seifert, 118 P. 
746, 747 (Wash. 1911); accord 1 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, with Comprehensive Notes 
on Each Particular Offence, the Process, Indictment, Plea, Defence, Evidence, Trial, Verdict, Judgment, and 
Punishment *168 (5th ed. 1847). 
108 LaFave et al., supra note 11, § 19.1(c); Warner & Cabot, supra note 100, at 588. 
109 LaFave et al., supra note 11, § 19.1(c); see, e.g., Butler v. State, 129 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ark. 1939); People v. Curtis, 
98 P.2d 228, 233 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939); State v. Engler, 251 N.W. 88, 92 (Iowa 1933); State v. Van Zelfden, 152 
So. 554, 556 (La. 1933); Commonwealth v. Farmer, 106 N.E. 150, 151 (Mass. 1914); People v. Tenerowicz, 253 N.W. 
296, 300–01 (Mich. 1934); People v. Bogdanoff, 171 N.E. 890, 893 (N.Y. 1930); State v. Domanski, 190 A. 854, 847 
(R.I. 1937); State v. Solomon, 71 P.2d 104, 105–07 (Utah 1937). 
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Institute in 1930 proposed a short-form indictment rule that allowed charging “[b]y using the name 
given to the offense by the common law or by a statute”—such as alleging just “murder” without 
stating any specific acts or even the generalized elements of the offense—and that proposal was 
adopted by several states.110  Overall, “[a]t one time, more than a dozen states had authorized some 
form of short-form pleading.”111 
Nevertheless, before the Federal Rules, the common law pleading system largely prevailed 
in the federal courts.112  Despite some federal efforts at reform that tempered the common law’s 
extremes,113 it was widely perceived that common law technicality governed.  Commentators 
noted, for example, that “archaic, prolix, and technical accusations . . . are still used in the federal 
courts and . . . often give rise to the interpretation of technicalities and the writing of briefs and the 
preparation of arguments over points that have no bearing on the merits of the case.”114 
 Change, however, was on the horizon.  Around the time of the promulgation of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, “there were many who believed that the various criminal rules in use in 
 
110 Code of Criminal Procedure §§ 152–54 (Am. Law Inst. 1930); Streamlining the Indictment, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 122, 
123–24 (1939). 
111 LaFave, supra note 11, § 19.1(c). 
112 See, e.g., Robert M. Hughes, Handbook of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts 34 (1904); Orfield’s 
Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules §§ 1:4, 7:22 (2019); Cummings, supra note 100, at 655; Holtzoff, supra 
note 100, at 124, 448; Medalie, supra note 100, at 3; Lester B. Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 22 Texas L. Rev. 37, 51 (1943); James M. Shellow & Susan W. Brenner, Speaking Motions: 
Recognition of Summary Judgment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 107 F.R.D. 139, 150, 157 (1985); Willard, supra 
note 106, at 293; Vanderbilt, supra note 100, at 377. 
113 In 1872, Congress passed a statute stating that “no indictment . . . shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, 
judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, 
which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant.”  Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 762 (1962).  The 
Supreme Court regarded that statute as supporting the view that “[t]he rigor of old common-law rules of criminal 
pleading has yielded, in modern practice, to the general principle that formal defects, not prejudicial, will be 
disregarded.”  Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932); accord Stanley F. Brewster, Federal Procedure § 
1024 (1940); Hughes, supra note 112, at 38. 
114 Orfield, supra note 112, at 51; accord Theodore W. Housel & Guy O. Walser, Defending and Prosecuting Federal 
Criminal Cases § 248 (1938); Cummings, supra note 100, at 655; Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 124, 448; Medalie, 
supra note 100, at 3; Vanderbilt, supra note 100, at 377. 
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the District Courts should be made uniform as well.”115  And, “[c]onsistent with the conclusions 
of civil reformers, proponents of criminal procedure reform thought the judiciary best suited to 
create rules of procedure.”116  Ultimately, “Congress passed legislation that gave the Supreme 
Court authority to draft rules of criminal procedure.”117  Then, as with the Civil Rules, the Supreme 
Court “appointed an Advisory Committee of eighteen representative members of the Bar including 
defense counsel, district attorneys, prosecutors, judges, former judges, and law professors to assist 
it in its undertaking.”118  The Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 
1944, and they went into effect in 1946.119 
c. The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Pleading 
Requirements 
 
Another aspect of American pleading history important to understanding Rule 7(c) is the 
fact that, before the Federal Rules, there existed a well-established relationship between civil and 
criminal pleading standards.  That historical relationship distills down to this: 19th and early 20th-
century state and federal courts repeatedly emphasized that the rules governing criminal pleadings 
were at least as strict as those applicable to civil pleadings, and—putting aside short-form 
indictment rules—they did so regardless of pleading regime.   
One common refrain was that criminal and civil pleading rules were equivalent.  For 
example, in 1843, the Circuit Court for the District of Ohio explained that “[t]he rules of pleading 
are the same in civil as in criminal actions.”120  And, in 1902, the Supreme Court of Indiana said 
 
115 Preface to 1 Drafting History, supra note 62, at xi; Meyn, supra note 14, at 706–07; see also Holtzoff, supra note 
100, at 122, 447 (explaining that federal criminal procedure had become “a tangled web of numerous heterogeneous 
strands,” drawing on “Acts of Congress,” common law, state law “as it existed on the date of the admission of the 
state into the Union,” and “current state law”). 
116 Meyn, supra note 14, at 707. 
117 Id.  
118 Preface to 1 Drafting History, supra note 62, at xi. 
119 See Fed. R. Crim. P. historical note. 
120 See United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1265, 1265 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 14,666). 
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that its code pleading indictment rule uses “precisely the language” as the rule “which declares the 
requisite of a complaint in a civil action” and that “[t]he whole purpose of the legislature, in the 
enactment of both the Civil and Criminal Code, was to do away with useless forms, repetition, and 
technicality, and thus bring the procedure in both classes of action to the ‘common 
understanding.’”121  Similar examples abound.122 
In addition, many decisions made clear that criminal pleading standards should be at least 
as stringent as, or more stringent than, their civil counterparts.  For instance, the Circuit Court for 
the District of Michigan said, in 1853, “[omitting a particular type of allegation] would not answer 
in an action for civil damages, much less then, in an indictment, which should be specially 
descriptive of the offense charged.”123  Similarly, a 1902 Missouri appeals court declared that 
“immemorial law” provided that “greater strictness of averment is required in criminal than in civil 
pleadings.”124  Likewise, in 1877, the Supreme Court of Alabama asserted that, although it was 
often said “that the rules of pleading are the same in criminal cases as in civil,” “the practice is to 
 
121 State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1902) (citation omitted). 
122 See, e.g., Webb v. York, 79 F. 616, 621 (8th Cir. 1897); Ware v. State, 225 S.W. 626, 631 (Ark. 1920); State v. 
Hand, 6 Ark. 165, 167 (1845); People v. King, 27 Cal. 507, 510 (1865); Werner v. State, 51 Ga. 426, 427–28 (1874); 
Ex parte McLeod, 128 P. 1106, 1108 (Idaho 1913); Hunt v. State, 159 N.E. 149, 150 (Ind. 1927); Brunaugh v. State, 
90 N.E. 1019, 1029 (Ind. 1910); State v. Stringfellow, 52 So. 1002, 1004 (La. 1910); State v. Bartley, 43 A. 19, 20 
(Me. 1899); State v. Keen, 34 Me. 500, 503 (1852); Commonwealth v. Child, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 198, 202 (1832); 
Enders v. People, 20 Mich. 233, 240 (1870); State v. Hinckley, 4 Minn. 345, 357–58 (1860); State v. Hayward, 83 
Mo. 299, 305, 312–13 (1884); State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 524, 525 (1825); State v. Hliboka, 78 P. 965, 967 (Mont. 1904); 
Territory v. Duncan, 6 P. 353, 355–56 (Mont. 1885); People v. Willis, 53 N.E. 29, 30 (N.Y. 1899); People v. Danahy, 
18 N.Y.S. 467, 468 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1892); State v. Whedbee, 67 S.E. 60, 62 (N.C. 1910); Palamarchuk v. State, 221 
P. 120, 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 3 Pen. & W. 142, 144–45 (Pa. 1831); State v. 
Crank, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 66, 69 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831); State v. Ryan, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 16, 16 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1826); State v. Hodgson, 28 A. 1089, 1093–94 (Vt. 1894); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 592, 608 (Va. 
1867) (Rives, J., dissenting); accord Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., Treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice § 93 (1899); 
Franklin Fiske Heard, Heard on the Criminal Law: Treatise Adapted to the Law and Practice of the Superior and 
Inferior Courts in Criminal Cases 101 (2d ed. 1882); Chitty, supra note 107, at *168, 172; Thomas W. Powell, Analysis 
of American Law 637 (1870); Howard C. Joyce & Arthur W. Blakemore, Treatise on the Law Governing Indictments 
with Forms §§ 276, 291, 295 (2d ed. 1924); Frank S. Rice, General Principles of the Law of Evidence in Their 
Application to the Trial of Criminal Cases at Common Law and Under the Criminal Codes of the Several States § 120 
(1893); William Chenault, Criminal Pleading, 1 Ky. L.J. 53, 53 (1881); Meyn, supra note 14, at 701–02. 
123 United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 978, 979 (C.C.D. Mich. 1853) (No. 16,234). 
124 Munchow v. Munchow, 70 S.W. 386, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902). 
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require greater strictness in criminal matters than in civil” and so, “in the absence of statutory 
regulations, as high a degree of certainty is required in criminal pleadings as in civil.”125  And, in 
1871, the Supreme Court of Indiana observed that, under its code pleading regime, “[t]he rule of 
[criminal and civil] pleading is the same,” but, “[i]f there was or should be any difference, it should 
be in favor of greater certainty and particularity in the criminal, than in the civil cases.”126  Finally, 
also in 1871, the Supreme Court of Oregon illustrated the minimum an indictment should include 
under its code pleading rule by noting, “In our practice in civil cases, a pleading is insufficient and 
subject to demurrer if the pleader alleges conclusions of law instead of the facts from which such 
conclusions may be deduced.”127  Again, there are numerous similar examples.128 
 In short, before the Federal Rules, criminal pleadings were regularly viewed as subject to 
at least as much scrutiny as civil pleadings. 
 
 
 
 
125 Noble v. State, 59 Ala. 73, 77–78 (1877) (citations omitted). 
126 Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485, 487 (1871). 
127 State v. Dougherty, 4 Or. 200, 202–03 (1871). 
128 See, e.g., Friedenstein v. United States, 125 U.S. 224, 238 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); United States v. Hunter, 
80 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir. 1936); Beck v. United States, 33 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v. Hous. Belt 
& Terminal Ry. Co., 205 F. 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1913); United States v. Korner, 56 F. Supp. 242, 250 (S.D. Cal. 1944); 
United States v. Sugar Inst., 51 F.2d 1066, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 F. 
127, 136 (E.D. Mo. 1916); United States v. Martindale, 146 F. 289, 293–94 (D. Kan. 1904); United States v. Reid, 73 
F. 289, 290 (W.D. Mich. 1896); United States v. Potter, 56 F. 97, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892); United States v. Fisler, 
25 F. Cas. 1091, 1091 (D. Ind. 1865) (No. 15,105); Seals v. State, 194 So. 682, 684 (Ala. 1939); People v. Cohen, 50 
P. 20, 21 (Cal. 1897); People v. Wakao, 165 P. 720, 721–22 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); Burnham v. State, 20 So. 548, 
549 (Fla. 1896); Hoyt v. State, 50 Ga. 313, 323 (1873); Locke v. State, 3 Ga. 534, 538 (1847); People v. Berman, 147 
N.E. 428, 551–52 (Ill. 1925); Haughn v. State, 65 N.E. 287, 288–89 (Ind. 1902); Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 
Ind. 478, 479–80 (1884); State v. Nutwell, 1 Gill 54, 56 (1843); People v. Maki, 223 N.W. 70, 74–75 (Mich. 1929); 
People v. Petheran, 31 N.W. 188, 196 (Mich. 1887) (Campbell, C.J., dissenting); State v. Patterson, 59 S.W. 1104, 
1105 (Mo. 1900); State v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125, 126 (1877); City of Louisiana v. Anderson, 73 S.W. 875, 876 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1903); State v. Kellogg, 36 P. 957, 960–62 (Mont. 1894); People v. Logan, 1 Nev. 110, 116 (1865); Manley 
v. People, 7 N.Y. 295, 304 (1852); Latham v. Westervelt, 26 Barb. 256, 260 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1857); Kain v. State, 8 
Ohio St. 306, 317–18 (1858); State v. Scarth, 3 P.2d 446, 450 (Okla. 1931); Smith v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 149 P. 1040, 
1040–41 (Or. 1915); State v. Coleman, 8 S.C. 237, 242 (1876); Patrick v. Smoke, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 147, 153–54 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1848); Commonwealth v. Peas, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 629, 631 (1834); Selvey v. Grafton Coal & Coke Co., 
79 S.E. 656, 657 (W. Va. 1913); accord United States v. Hanna, 7 C.M.R. 571, 578 (A.F.B.R. 1952); 1 Bishop, supra 
note 106, §§ 320–21 (1895); Cyclopedia of Law 129 (Charles E. Chadman, ed. 1908); James Gould et al., Treatise on 
the Principles of Pleading 1 n.b (6th ed. 1909). 
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3. The Original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c) 
 
An additional source central to the meaning of Rule 7(c) is the Rule’s original Advisory 
Committee Note.  That Note is important, first, because it explicitly references Rule 8(a).  It says: 
“This rule introduces a simple form of indictment, illustrated by Forms 1 to 11 in the Appendix of 
Forms.  Cf. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”129  In other words, it suggests a 
relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a).   
That relationship, moreover, seems to be one of analogy.  At the time the Note was adopted, 
the “cf.” signal directed readers to “where contrasted, analogous, or explanatory views or 
statements may be found.”130  And, nothing indicates that the cross-reference to Rule 8(a) was 
meant to direct readers to contrasting or explanatory material.  Furthermore, a separate portion of 
the Note—referring to a different provision of Rule 7(c)—contains a nearly indistinguishable “cf.” 
cross-reference to Rule 8: 
The provision . . . that it may be alleged in a single count that the means by which 
the defendant committed the offense are unknown, or that he committed it by one 
or more specified means, is intended to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the 
purpose of alleging the commission of the offense by different means or in different 
ways.  Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e)(2).131   
 
That second cross-reference, relating to Rule 8(e)(2), was plainly meant to convey analogy 
because, when the Advisory Committee Note was written, Rule 8(e)(2) permitted exactly what the 
Note says the referenced portion of Rule 7(c) was designed to accomplish: Rule 8(e)(2) allowed 
parties to “set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.”132  There is no reason to think 
 
129 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) advisory committee note. 
130 CF., Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933). 
131 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) advisory committee note. 
132 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (1938) (emphasis added). 
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the cross-reference to Rule 8(a), which, again, is essentially identical to the cross-reference to Rule 
8(e)(2) and appears nearby in the same Note, was meant to convey something different. 
The Advisory Committee Note is also significant because of the following sentence, which 
appears directly after the cross-reference to Rule 8(a): 
For discussion of the effect of this rule and a comparison between the present form 
of indictment and the simple form introduced by this rule, see Vanderbilt, 29 
A.B.A.Jour. 376, 377; Homer Cummings, 29 A.B.A.Jour. 654, 655; Holtzoff, 3 
F.R.D. 445, 448–449; Holtzoff, 12 Geo.Washington L.R. 119, 123–126; Medalie, 
4 Lawyers Guild R. (3) 1, 3. 
 
What is important there is the cited articles.  All are used to depict what Rule 7(c) was meant to 
achieve, and all but one were written by members of the Advisory Committee that drafted the 
Criminal Rules.133  Those articles make clear that the Committee wanted to simplify criminal 
pleadings from the technical and intricate common law form, but not at all costs.  Instead, the 
drafters wanted to balance simplifying procedures and protecting defendants’ rights, and they even 
sought to strengthen defendants’ rights where possible.134  Indeed, one reason why they wanted to 
simplify pleadings was to protect defendants by ensuring they could better understand the 
 
133 New Rules on Criminal Procedure in the Federal Courts, 15 N.Y. St. B.A. Bull. 175, 175 (1943).  The exception 
is the article by Homer Cummings. 
134 Cummings, supra note 100, at 654–55 (“While concerning ourselves with efficiency and expedition great care 
must be taken to avoid the impairment of any of the just rights of the accused. . . . At all times [the drafters] have been 
sedulous in preserving the rights of the accused.”); Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 123, 447 (“The simplification of 
procedure has been accomplished . . . without sacrifice of any safeguards that properly surround a defendant in a 
criminal case.  In fact, in some respects the new rules have cemented and strengthened the protection accorded to the 
defendant.”); Medalie, supra note 100, at 2 (“The rules therefore must be drawn to safeguard the innocent, to facilitate 
the prosecution and speedy conviction of the guilty, without sacrificing fundamental principles of justice and fair 
play.”); Vanderbilt, supra note 100, at 376 (“In drafting the rules, the committee has been guided by two basic 
principles.  First, its purpose has been to provide a simple procedure devoid of technicalities . . . . The second 
principle . . . was the necessity of preserving unimpaired and of strengthening where essential and desirable those 
rights of a defendant which are regarded as basic in the Anglo-American conception of criminal justice.”). 
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allegations against them.135  And, in order to avoid the delay caused by motions for bills of 
particulars, the drafters decided against permitting “short-form” indictments.136,137 
4. The Drafting History of the Criminal Rules 
The final source relevant to understanding Rule 7(c) is the drafting history of the Criminal 
Rules.  That history reveals six critical points that are crucial to the meaning of the Rule. 
The first critical point is that the Criminal Rules were initially based on and tied to the Civil 
Rules, but the drafters ultimately severed any connection between those sets of Rules. 
 
135 Cummings, supra note 100, at 655 (“[The simplified indictment] is a great improvement upon the ancient form 
which could serve only to bewilder an accused and impel his counsel to reach for a microscope to discern some 
possible defect in so lengthy and dismal a document.”); Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 124, 448 (“Actually, instead of 
apprizing the defendant of the crime of which he is accused, [the type of indictment Rule 7(c) repudiated] tends to 
mystify him.”); Medalie, supra note 100, at 3 (“The need to guard against microscopic technical flaws [under the old 
pleading rules] had resulted in a plethora of logomachy in which lurked, well hidden, the substance of the 
offense. . . . It is hoped that this new rule will lead to the swift abolition of the lengthy, wordy and obscure indictments 
which obfuscated, rather than stated, the facts constituting the crime.”). 
136 See Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 125–26, 449 (“The form adopted by the Committee is not what is technically 
known as the short form indictment, which merely names the crime with which the defendant is charged, by its legal 
term, without specifying or summarizing the facts of the offense.  The Committee deliberately rejected indictments of 
this type, because they are apt to evoke motions for bills of particulars and thereby constitute a source of unnecessary 
delay.”); Vanderbilt, supra note 100, at 377 (“A simple form of indictment is proposed which constitutes a 
compromise between the present prolix document and the extremely short form.  The objection to the latter is that it 
almost invariably evokes a motion for a bill of particulars and thereby is productive of delay.”); see also supra notes 
108–111 and accompanying text. 
137 Several contemporary articles written by the drafters but not cited in the Advisory Committee Note are in accord.  
See, e.g., George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 Yale L.J. 197, 205–06 (1947); 
The; Alexander Holtzoff, The New Federal Criminal Procedure, 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 111, 114–15 (1946); 
Lester B. Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11 N.Y.U. L. Q. 167, 175 (1948); Lester B. Orfield, The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 26 Neb. L. Rev. 570, 580 (1947); cf. George H. Dession, The New Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 Yale L.J. 694, 696 (1946) (“Most of the articles by Committee members were 
written while the enterprise was still in progress, and reflect the policy considerations which moved the Committee.”).  
And, around the time of the Criminal Rules’ promulgation, multiple drafters commented that Rule 7(c) was of limited 
effect, further suggesting that they did not seek to simplify pleadings at all costs.  George Dession, for example, said: 
“Simple and non-technical pleadings are contemplated, as illustrated in the Appendix of Forms prepared by the 
Advisory Committee.  But since such pleadings were entirely sufficient before the adoption of the Rule, it may be 
assumed that prolixity up to a point will continue to be tolerated and that the Rule will not end the flow of republication 
by commercial annotators of trial court rulings on procedural points which have little significance beyond the 
particular case and serve chiefly to augment the work of law clerks and the costs of litigation.”  Dession, The New 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, supra, at 205–06.  Likewise, Arthur Vanderbilt explained that an indictment 
“could always be” “a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged” and that he did not “know whether we can succeed except by moral suasion in getting the indictment to be 
concise and definite instead of prolix, verbose and involved.”  Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (Feb. 1946), in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Notes and Institute Proceedings 157 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law ed., 1946). 
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When the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, James Robinson, prepared his first draft of 
the Criminal Rules, he based that draft on the Civil Rules and sought to directly link the Civil and 
Criminal Rules.138  He emphasized, for instance, that the draft “follow[ed] as closely as possible 
in organization, in numbering and in substance the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”139  He 
further explained that the draft was “prepared with the idea of carrying that parallelism as far as 
possible” and that adhering to the organization and content of the Civil Rules was “a fundamental 
principle.”140  And, the first draft included a “Conformity Rule,” which stated, “The procedure 
under these rules is designed to conform as closely as possible to the procedure under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and these rules shall be construed with that purpose in view.”141 
The Committee, however, quickly rejected the idea to align the Criminal and Civil Rules.  
Herbert Wechsler, for instance, noted that such an approach seemed “questionable, because we are 
dealing with situations in criminal cases in which the dominant policies may well be different.”142  
Arthur Vanderbilt, likewise, questioned the idea because “the problems of criminal law . . . are 
quite different from some of the problems of civil law.”143  Additionally, Alexander Holtzoff stated 
that “the problems of criminal procedure are so different, the work in criminal cases so different 
from trying a civil case, that it would be dangerous to tie the criminal rules too strongly to the civil 
rules.”144  And, as a result of the discussion on this subject, the drafters voted unanimously to strike 
the Conformity Rule.145  
 
138 Meyn, supra note 14, at 710. 
139 Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 (Sept. 1941) [hereinafter September 
1941 Hearing], https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes. 
140 Id. at 4, 6. 
141 Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Sept. 1941), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure, CIS 
No. CM-301-17 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
142 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 18. 
143 Id. at 21. 
144 Id. at 22. 
145 Id. at 23. 
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Even after that, moreover, the drafters continued to emphasize that civil and criminal 
procedure should be kept separate.  For example, in debating whether Civil Rule 11 should apply 
in criminal cases, Committee members said: 
Mr. Dean.  It points out the basic difficulties when we try to relate civil with 
criminal.  We may have the same situation later on when someone tries to compare 
the civil and criminal, and actually they should not be compared. 
 
Mr. Wechsler.  I think any general student of the subject would be as 
surprised as I am to see the civil rules adopted as a model for the system of criminal 
procedure. 
 
Mr. Dession.  Yes; I think our duty is to find out what are the problems in 
the criminal law and to draw a code for them, and to pay no attention to what is in 
the civil code.  
 
Mr. Orfield.  I used to think the criminal and civil were unlike; but from 
actual practice I was surprised to find how similar they are. 
 
Mr. Holtzoff.  But the attorneys in the courts say they are different.146  
 
The second critical point is that civil pleading reforms played a foundational role in the 
development of Rule 7(c) and its “essential facts” language.  The Advisory Committee explicitly 
and repeatedly invoked civil reforms in designing Rule 7(c), and it expressly amended and crafted 
the Rule to be more like Civil Rule 8(a).  Furthermore, although the Committee also drew heavily 
on criminal code pleading reforms in creating Rule 7(c), it treated the criminal and civil pleading 
practices it sought to adopt as interchangeable. 
Although the first draft of the Criminal Rules broadly followed the Civil Rules, the first 
draft of Rule 7(c) was designed to be more exacting than Rule 8(a).147  It read as follows: 
The written accusation shall be a plain and concise statement of (1) the specification 
of the court’s jurisdiction, (2) the source of the written accusation, namely the grand 
jury or the United States Attorney, (3) the name of the defendant, (4) the name of 
 
146 Id. at 367. 
147 Robinson regarded pleading as “one place where the civil rules and the criminal rules are different” because, in 
his view, criminal pleading involved “stating the grounds for putting a man in the penitentiary” and “[t]here is 
nothing comparable to that in the civil rules.”  See infra note 159 and accompanying text.  
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the alleged commission of the offense, (5) the place of the alleged commission of 
the offense, (6) the act or acts or the omission of legal duty by which the defendant 
is alleged to have committed the offense, (7) the criminal intent if any with which 
the defendant is alleged to have committed the offense, (8) the name of the person 
injured, if anyone, by the alleged offense, (9) any other fact or allegation which 
may be necessary because of special requirements, statutory or otherwise, for notice 
to the defendant and to the court of the act and offense of which the defendant is 
accused, and (10) the statute, by its official or customary citation, which the 
defendant is alleged to have violated.148 
 
Discussion of that Rule began with Committee member Frederick Crane.  Crane believed that the 
Rule’s ten specifications might be too much and argued that they should be replaced with simpler 
language: “a brief statement of facts constituting the crime.”149 
The Committee recognized that Crane’s proposed language was similar to criminal code 
pleading statutes, so those statutes set the initial focus of the debate.  George Medalie, for instance, 
said, “Judge Crane, you have in mind . . . the latest provision of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure with respect to the simplified indictment.”150  And, Holtzoff suggested that Crane’s idea 
was to adopt a type of simplified indictment that had been used—by a district attorney named 
James Cropsey—under the New York criminal code pleading provision Medalie had cited, which 
would say, for example, “that the defendant murdered John Smith by a fatal gunshot wound.”151 
After some further discussion, the drafters started to invoke civil pleading reform practices, 
interchangeably with criminal ones, as informing Crane’s language.  For instance, after Crane 
 
148 Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 8 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Sept. 1941), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure, CIS 
No. CM-301-56–05 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
149 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 198–99. 
150 Id. at 200.  Crane rejected Medalie’s comparison to New York law, which, in Crane’s view, did not require a 
statement of the facts.  Id. at 199–200.  That disagreement, however, was the result of a simple misunderstanding.  In 
1881, New York had adopted a pleading requirement like Crane’s.  People v. Iannone, 384 N.E.2d 656, 661 (N.Y. 
1978); see Charles B. Nutting, The Indictment in New York, 19 Cornell L.Q. 580, 587 (1934).  In 1929, however, it 
enacted a short-form indictment rule.  Iannone, 384 N.E.2d at 661.  Nevertheless, indictments under the 1881 law 
remained proper.  Id. at 661; Nutting, supra, at 587.  Thus, Medalie was referring to the 1881 law, and Crane was 
rejecting the 1929 one. 
151 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 200–02; James C. Cropsey, Jurist, Dies at 64, N.Y. Times, June 17, 
1934, at 23. 
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clarified that his proposal did not mean that indictments actually needed to be short, Medalie 
responded: 
You have the same situation as in modern equity pleading.  In our code 
states it is provided for the complaint giving a simple and concise statement of the 
facts constituting the right to [relief].  That is all that is necessary.  Some lawyers 
do it, but they are scared to death when they do it.   
To this day, notwithstanding the simple code of pleading, the average 
complaint calling for equitable [relief] in any pleaded state of facts is a virtual 
pamphlet.152 
 
He then said that, as to the pleading standard for the Criminal Rules, “if you just have a rule such 
as you have in the civil practice acts and codes of criminal procedure where simple, nontechnical 
forms of pleading are provided for by saying, ‘a concise statement of facts constituting the 
offense,’ that is sufficient.”153  Medalie also made clear that he viewed such a Rule as requiring 
the type of “simple indictment” that had been used by Cropsey in New York.154   
 Immediately after that, and in apparent perceived harmony with Medalie’s position, the 
Committee began to discuss whether to adopt a Rule comparable to Civil Rule 8(a) incorporating 
Crane’s proffered language: 
Mr. Holtzoff.  Right there, Mr. Medalie, let me say that the civil rules, under 
Rule 8-A, requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.  We could adopt that language and require a short and plain 
statement of facts constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged.  
 
Mr. Crane.  Say “a concise statement of facts.” 
 
Mr. Youngquist.  I like the word “plain” because it eliminates these 
technical forms. 
 
Mr. Crane.  You want to state that he is charged with the crime first, and 
then you state the facts. 
 
Mr. Holtzoff.  Yes. 
 
 
152 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 206. 
153 Id. 
154 See id. at 200–02, 205–07. 
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The Chairman [(Vanderbilt)].  May this be a fair solution of the problem, to 
adopt the language of the corresponding section of the civil rules for this purpose 
and then in a note indicate what would be some of the different elements that would 
be specified.155 
 
Ultimately, Vanderbilt—serving as Chairman—asked if the Committee was “generally 
agreed that it is sufficient . . . to provide a paraphrase corresponding to the civil rules?”156  There 
was some pushback by other Committee members, who wanted the Rule to be more like the first 
draft version.157  Accordingly, and after more deliberation, Vanderbilt explained that “[t]here seem 
to be two schools of thought”: “[o]ne seems to be content with a mere statement of facts, and the 
other wants something longer.”158 
Thereafter, the Committee further debated whether the criminal pleading Rule should be 
based on Rule 8(a) or impose more detailed requirements: 
Mr. Holtzoff.  You have civil rules which have been in effect for three years, 
and they have worked out very well. 
 
Mr. Robinson.  Here is one place where the civil rules and the criminal rules 
are different.  You are stating the grounds for putting a man in the penitentiary.  
There is nothing comparable to that in the civil rules. 
 
Mr. Holtzoff.  I think that if you have a statement of the facts that is all that 
any defendant is entitled to. 
 
 . . . 
 
The Chairman [(Vanderbilt)].  Haven’t we pressed this issue about as much 
as we can?  The issue is pretty clear: either to have the rule stated in substantially 
the same form as it is now or alternatively to have it made in paraphrase with the 
civil rules corresponding to it with an accompanying annotation by the reporter 
giving it substance plus some specimen forms in an appendix?159 
 
 
155 Id. at 207. 
156 Id. at 209. 
157 See, e.g., id. at 209 (“Mr. Seth.  I would like to see most of the points in here left in.”). 
158 Id. at 214. 
159 Id. at 218–19. 
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Vanderbilt then proposed that the Committee “think about this issue and perhaps see a revised 
form of the rule in a form suggested by Judge Crane, and then tomorrow proceed to come to a 
tentative decision on it?”160  A brief discussion followed, however, in which Holtzoff again 
suggested that, “[i]f you take the civil rules, you can say ‘plain and specific statement of the facts 
constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged’, then paraphrase the civil rule.”161 
The Committee reconvened the next day, and, when the pleading Rule came up again, the 
focus shifted back to criminal pleading practices.162  Vanderbilt raised the issue and asked whether 
the Committee was ready for a tentative vote.163  Then, Medalie—who had consistently invoked 
civil and criminal code pleading reforms interchangeably—again noted that New York’s criminal 
code pleading provision contained language similar to Crane’s and said that that provision had 
permitted “everything from what Cropsey has done to prolix indictments.”164  Vanderbilt 
eventually brought the question to a head by calling for a vote on whether to tentatively adopt 
“[t]his form presented by the reporter or the short form165 advocated by Judge Crane and just 
quoted by Mr. Medalie, to be accompanied by a note for the guidance of the district attorney, 
giving the substance of this rule.”166  The Committee unanimously voted for Crane’s version.167 
 
160 Id. at 219. 
161 Id. at 220. 
162 Id. at 335. 
163 Id. 
164 See id. at 335–36. 
165 “Short form” here did not mean an indictment merely naming the offense.  Cf. supra notes 108–111 and 
accompanying text.  Rather, it referred to a short rule repudiating the common law form.  The Committee used the 
term “short form” inconsistently. 
166 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 337–38. 
167 Id. at 338.  After the Committee tentatively voted on Crane’s language, Robinson produced a new draft of the Rule 
incorporating that language which largely matched the final version.  See Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 244 (Jan. 1942) [hereinafter January 1942 Hearing], https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes (“The written accusation shall be a plain, concise, 
and definite statement of the essential facts which constitute the offence charged against the accused.”).  The 
Committee then voted to approve the new Rule.  See id. at 244–48. 
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Later discussions of the Rule, moreover, returned to civil pleading reform practices.  
During review by the Subcommittee on Style, several Advisory Committee members suggested 
that an indictment might simply include a statement of facts and lead to convictions for whatever 
crimes those facts supported.168  Wechsler then clarified that he thought such pure fact pleading 
was the import of the Committee’s chosen pleading language—precisely because it drew upon 
civil pleading reform practices.  In his words, “I thought [just setting forth the facts and letting the 
chips fall where they may fall] was the purpose of the rule, that is, it followed the civil precedent 
that goes back to the earliest codes, that you shall have a plain and concise statement of the 
facts.”169 
The third critical point is that, although a core aspect of the Committee’s pleading 
discussion involved whether to adopt Robinson’s or Crane’s proposed language, the drafters also 
repeatedly indicated that Crane’s language was paraphrasing Robinson’s.  As Crane explained 
when he initially proposed his Rule, “You can say ‘a brief statement of facts constituting the 
crime’; it covers all these [the ten specifications from Robinson’s first draft version] and yet leaves 
some liberality.”170  And, after Robinson produced a new draft Rule incorporating Crane’s 
language, he described it as reflecting Crane’s idea “to try to state in a few words what was 
contained in the former rule, which sought to catalog or list the essential elements of the 
offence.”171 
 
168 Minutes of Meetings of Sub-Committee on Style of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure 296, 
298–99 (Mar.-Apr. 1942), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice 
and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure, CIS Nos. CM-201-01, 204-12, 204-14–15 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.) [hereinafter March-April 1942 Hearing]. 
169 Id. at 299. 
170 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 198. 
171 January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 244.  There were comments to the contrary.  For example, Robinson 
objected to Crane’s proposal because he believed it would “simply take [the ninth specification] and make it the rule.”  
September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 218.  And, others were opposed to certain of the specifications.  See, e.g., 
id. at 211 (“Mr. Holtzoff.  I am opposed to point 10.”).  But, the drafters at least to some degree accepted the idea that 
Crane’s language captured the essence of the more stringent first draft of the Rule. 
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 The fourth critical point is that the Advisory Committee adopted its “essential facts” 
language despite receiving feedback that warned of the problems such language could cause—the 
problems of code pleading Rule 8(a)’s drafters sought to avoid172—and that highlighted Rule 8(a)’s 
omission of the word “facts.”  
During the drafting process, the Committee collected commentary from the bench and bar 
on drafts of the Criminal Rules, and it received numerous responses relating to its pleading Rule.  
Those responses, however, included serious criticism of the proposed “essential facts” language.  
For example, one commentator remarked: 
[T]hat first sentence may lead to trouble, to say “The information or the indictment 
shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged.”  Now I think that probably is a good a statement 
as one could make, but we are always confronted with the question of whether your 
reference to essential facts, as to whether that means essential evidentiary facts or 
whether that means essential ultimate facts, and you will have cases in which 
counsel for the defendants will contend that while perhaps the stated facts are 
inferences from facts and those are mixed questions of law and fact . . . this rule 
contemplates that the evidentiary facts shall be stated.173 
 
Another suggested that the Rule be rewritten to omit reference to “essential facts” because then it 
would “not call for taking the technical distinction between evidence, facts and conclusions of law 
as the [draft Rule] does, or at least may,” and he further advised the Committee to “[c]ompare the 
Federal Civil Rules where in Rule 8(b) [sic] and elsewhere in connection with pleading there is no 
reference to pleading ‘facts.’” 174  And, a third noted: 
[The Rule] reads that the indictment or information shall state “the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged.”  While some of the Forms evidence a liberal 
interpretation of what the charge may be, the requirement, in the Rule, of the 
 
172 See supra notes 92–94 and infra notes 237–256 and accompanying text. 
173 Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in 2 Drafting History, supra note 62, at 70–71. 
174 Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in 3 Drafting History, supra note 62, at 368–69. 
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allegation of “facts” touches a matter that has given trouble, it seems to me, 
whenever it has been encountered.175 
 
In short, the Committee was warned that its “essential facts” language might lead to the 
same problems as code pleading and that Rule 8(a) did not use the word “facts.”  Nevertheless, the 
drafters retained that language in full. 
 The fifth critical point is that the Committee considered whether to allow short-form 
indictments and decided against doing so.  Crane from the outset rejected the idea, stressing that 
he “d[id] not like” pleading requirements under which “you need not state the facts.”176  And, in 
arguing for pleading language reminiscent of civil and criminal code pleading, Medalie 
explained: “That is the simple form of indictment instead of the short form which names only the 
offense.  I understand that the sentiment is against simply naming the offense and later giving the 
particulars.”177  Furthermore, after the tentative vote adopting Crane’s Rule, Crane again clarified 
that the Committee had not approved of short-form indictments.178  Likewise, at a later point, 
Robinson said, in response to a statement by Medalie: “But who said the short form indictment or 
information was going to be adopted or recognized?  We haven’t adopted that, have we?”179  
Medalie replied, “I am not saying the short form is adopted.”180 
Additionally, one Committee member affirmatively argued for short-form indictments.  
George Dession asserted that, “if we want to guard against pleadings being dismissed through an 
inadvertent error, then I think the extremely short form of pleading might be worth considering 
here.”181  Medalie observed, however, that such an indictment was “of course . . . not covered by 
 
175 Id. 
176 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 199–200. 
177 Id. at 206–07. 
178 See id. at 342. 
179 January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 243. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 253. 
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our discussion at all.”182  Additionally, Holtzoff rebuffed Dession, saying, “Of course, we want to 
avoid a bill of particulars as much as possible by having the indictments set forth sufficient [sic] 
so that bills of particulars would not be necessary.”183  Dession pushed back, contending that the 
prosecutor will “put his allegations of fact in, because he wants to avoid a bill of particulars, too,” 
and Robinson and Holtzoff both acknowledged that that was true.184  After that, some members 
toyed with allowing short-form indictments, but Crane, who was then serving as Chairman, 
brought the conversation to a close.185  No change was adopted.186 
Moreover, the development of Rule 7(c)’s Advisory Committee Note shows that Dession’s 
proposal was rejected.  The first draft of that Note stated: “The form of indictment or information 
proposed is not the short form, which often requires supplementation by the dilatory and 
technically restrictive bill of particulars.”187  That language, in substance, prevailed for multiple 
drafts before the final version.188  And, the articles cited in the final Note confirm that short-form 
indictments were prohibited.189 
 
182 Id. at 255. 
183 Id. at 256. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 256–58. 
186 Id. at 258, 275, 278–79. 
187 Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 8 advisory committee note (Tentative Draft No. 5, June 1942), microformed on Records of 
the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal 
Procedure, CIS No. CM-901-63 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
188 See Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 7(c) advisory committee note (Tentative Draft No. 6, Fall 1942), microformed on Records 
of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal 
Procedure, CIS No. CM-1001-75 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 8(d) advisory committee note (Preliminary 
Draft No. 1, Mar. 1943), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice 
and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure, CIS No. CM-1624-64 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Fed. R. 
Crim. P. Rule 7(c) advisory committee note (Preliminary Draft No. 2, Feb. 1944), microformed on Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal 
Procedure, CIS No. CM-1706-25 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
189 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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The final critical point is that the drafters recognized that setting the criminal pleading 
standard was a momentous decision and approached it carefully.  Initial notes of matters to be 
covered by the Criminal Rules directed the Committee to: 
Substitute a short form190 indictment for the archaic, prolix, technical forms of 
indictments that are still used in the Federal courts and that frequently give rise to 
the interposition of technicalities and writing of briefs and the preparation of 
arguments that have no bearing upon the merits of the case.”191   
 
When Robinson introduced his first draft, moreover, he explained that, as to pleading, “the 
recommendations from the bar are quite heavy” and “we have lots of recommendations of the short 
form192 of indictment.”193  And, as a result, he made clear that serious thought had been put into 
the pleading question, saying: “So the effort has been made to decide what the answer is to ‘short.’  
Just what is your short form194 of indictment?”195  Then, after extensive debate over pleading 
requirements, Vanderbilt called for a vote but Medalie urged restraint.196  He stressed that the 
Committee was “dealing with one of the most fundamental questions that [it was] going to decide 
here” and that “we should do a lot of thinking about it.”197  That guidance was followed.198   
 Additionally, when the Committee met again later to discuss pleading, Robinson 
emphasized how important that discussion was—albeit in the context of deciding whether 
indictments should cite the charging statute or regulation.  In his words: 
I feel pretty strongly about this because it is very fundamental.  I feel we have the 
responsibility of all these requests that have been coming in here about the short 
 
190 See supra note 165. 
191 Notes of Matters to be Covered by Rules of Criminal Procedure 2 (Feb. 1941), microformed on Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal 
Procedure, CIS No. CM-1601-05 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
192 See supra note 165. 
193 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 198. 
194 See supra note 165. 
195 Id.  
196 Id. at 214. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 219. 
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form199 of indictment.  I believe about all we are doing is telling them that the 
indictment ought to be short, and now again we come back to the question . . . Just 
how short is “short”?200 
 
Finally, Rule 7(c)’s language was ultimately adopted only after multiple votes,201 as well 
as considerable debate and deliberation. 
ii. How the Sources Demonstrate that Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Be at 
Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a) 
The foregoing sources, taken together, demonstrate that Rule 7(c) was designed to be at 
least as stringent as Rule 8(a). 
To start, in crafting Rule 7(c) and adopting its “essential facts” language, the Advisory 
Committee repeatedly invoked Rule 8(a) and used it as a key design template.  And, it did so in 
moving away from what it considered to be a more stringent requirement contained in the first 
draft of the Rule—not in moving towards Rule 8(a) from a less stringent requirement.  
Furthermore, although the Committee did not just draw on Rule 8(a), it treated the civil and 
criminal pleading reforms it relied upon as interchangeable and nowhere indicated that those other 
reforms were less demanding than Rule 8(a). 
Additionally, the Committee’s reliance on Rule 8(a) led to a real and tangible connection 
between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a).  Instead of leaving its references to Rule 8(a) to the hearing room 
and the pages of a transcript, the Committee elected to include an explicit cross-reference to Rule 
8(a) in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c).  And, the drafters plainly wanted that cross-
reference to signify an analogous relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a)—in line with their 
understanding of the Rules during the drafting discussions—given their use of the “cf.” signal in 
 
199 See supra note 165. 
200 Id. at 341. 
201 Id. at 338; January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 244–48. 
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the cross-reference as well as their utilization of a virtually identical cross-reference nearby in the 
same Note to convey analogy between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8. 
The decision to associate Rule 7(c) with Rule 8(a), moreover, was significant and meant to 
have force.  The first draft of the Criminal Rules was keyed to the Civil Rules, but the drafters 
eliminated any generalized relationship between those Rules.  Rule 7(c), however, followed 
precisely the opposite path.  The first draft of Rule 7(c) was designed to depart from Rule 8(a),202 
but it was later—after the Committee had already severed the relationship between the Civil and 
Criminal Rules—specifically redesigned with Rule 8(a) in mind and linked to Rule 8(a) expressly 
by way of the cross-reference in the Advisory Committee Note.  In short, the Committee 
purposefully bolstered the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) at the same time as it 
severed connections between the Civil and Criminal Rules generally.  It is profoundly unlikely 
that the drafters did that casually or without intending to have a meaningful impact on the Rule. 
What is more, there is strong evidence that the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 
8(a) the drafters anticipated was that Rule 7(c) would demand more than Rule 8(a).  First of all, 
the drafters’ “essential facts” language was highly reminiscent of criminal and civil code pleading 
requirements, which—at least on the civil side—Rule 8(a) was designed to repudiate.  Indeed, the 
drafters of Rule 8(a) carefully avoided requiring the pleading of “facts” in order to avert the 
problems of fact pleading under the civil codes—and, after the Civil Rules were adopted, 
commentators argued that “facts” should be added back in to ensure that facts would be pleaded.  
Moreover, the drafters of Rule 7(c) were specifically alerted to the problems of fact pleading that 
might be generated by their “essential facts” language and were informed that Rule 8(a) did not 
refer to “facts,” but they stayed the course.  Further, during drafting discussions, multiple 
 
202 Recall that Robinson viewed pleading as “one place where the civil rules and the criminal rules are different.”  See 
supra notes 147, 159 and accompanying text. 
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Committee members cited civil code pleading as informing its chosen pleading language and 
supplying the appropriate criminal pleading standard; and, given that the drafters referenced 
pleading reform practices interchangeably, they did not treat the other practices they relied upon 
as imposing a standard less stringent than civil code pleading.  Finally, even though the “essential 
facts” language of Rule 7(c) was intended to be more like Rule 8(a) than the more detailed first 
draft of the Rule, the Committee also at times treated that language as paraphrasing the first draft. 
More broadly, the Committee never abrogated the traditional balance between civil and 
criminal pleading standards.  As noted above, criminal pleading standards were historically viewed 
as at least as stringent as civil ones, both under the common law and reform codes.  In designing 
Rule 7(c), the drafters explicitly drew upon both civil and criminal pleading requirements 
interchangeably, showing that they accepted the idea that those requirements were at least 
comparable.  And, the Committee elected to adopt pleading language reminiscent of the civil and 
criminal reform codes, thereby incorporating the historical balance that language represented.  The 
drafters did so, moreover, notwithstanding that Rule 8(a) was designed to move away from code 
pleading.  And, they rejected more radical reforms, such as the short-form indictment, that might 
have indicated a desire to upset the traditional pleading balance.203 
Finally, Rule 7(c) was the result of careful deliberation.  The drafters recognized that 
designing a criminal pleading Rule was a profoundly important endeavor, central to the project of 
creating the Criminal Rules.  As a result, they engaged in protracted debate over what should be 
required.  They refused to decide the matter too quickly, and they ultimately voted on Rule 7(c) 
on multiple occasions.  Rule 7(c)’s design, in other words, was no accident. 
 
203 Also, several drafters indicated that Rule 7(c) did not change much.  See supra note 137.  That further suggests that 
the Rule was not designed to upset the traditional balance, especially given that Rule 8(a) was intended to minimize 
civil pleading requirements.  See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, the drafters of Rule 7(c) intended to create a pleading standard at least as stringent 
as Rule 8(a).204 
B. The Original Design of Rule 7(c) Should Control Our Interpretation of the 
Rule Today 
 
 The forgoing discussion shows that Rule 7(c) was designed to be at least as stringent as 
Rule 8(a).  But, why should that control how the Rule is interpreted today?  There are several 
reasons. 
 First, the intended design of Rule 7(c) offers powerful insights into the meaning of the 
Rule, especially given the care the drafters exercised in designing it.  And, there does not appear 
to be any better source for ascertaining the Rule’s significance.205 
 
204 As noted above, in reaching this conclusion and analyzing its implications for the interpretation of Rule 7(c) today, 
this Article extends beyond the previous literature.  See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.  However, Ion 
Meyn’s work warrants brief separate discussion here.  That is because it too indicates that Rule 7(c)’s drafting history 
shows that the drafters adopted the civil pleading standard—albeit not in the context of determining the Rule’s proper 
interpretation—but it describes the history differently and, respectfully, in a problematic way. 
For example, Meyn frames the debate over Rule 7(c) as simply a battle of wills between Robinson—who 
wanted a criminal pleading standard more stringent than the civil standard—and Holtzoff—who “advocated for the 
full embrace of notice pleading”—and he treats the Rule’s “essential facts” language as stemming merely from 
“concessions” to Medalie and Crane.  See Meyn, supra note 14, at 715–16 (“Robinson attempted to find a middle 
ground, rejecting the formalized and unyielding language of the common law but also building in a minimum baseline 
of notice.  Robinson defended his decision to deviate by a degree from the civil standard: ‘You are stating the grounds 
for putting a man in the penitentiary.  There is nothing comparable to that in the civil rules.’  Holtzoff disagreed and 
advocated for the full embrace of notice pleading, again praising the civil code’s simplicity. . . . With some 
concessions to Medalie and Frederick E. Crane, who thought a prosecutor should at least provide a ‘concise statement 
of facts,’ Holtzoff persuaded others to adopt the civil rule in this instance.” (citations omitted)); id. at 716 n.120 
(“Holtzoff stated, ‘We could adopt that language and require a short and plain statement of facts constituting the 
offense with which the defendant is charged.’  Holtzoff may have added the last part--a short and plain statement of 
facts--to placate a member who advocated for such a rule.”).  Meyn also says that “the chairman by fiat ultimately 
adopted Holtzoff’s version” of the Rule.  Id. at 716 n.120. 
That account, however, is not quite accurate and does not capture the thoughtful and deliberate way in which 
Rule 7(c) was designed and decided upon.  As shown above, the discussion about Rule 7(c)’s contours and language 
was rich and thorough, and it involved numerous Committee members, not just Robinson and Holtzoff.  Moreover, 
the “essential facts” language was not merely inserted by Holtzoff to appease a few members; rather, that language, 
in substance, was proposed at the outset of the discussion (by Crane), served as the core point of debate, and its 
acceptance was a significant choice.  Finally, Rule 7(c)’s language was voted on multiple times and was not adopted 
“by fiat.” 
205 In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court indicated that it had to interpret the Federal Rules by reference to 
how it “understood [them] upon [their] adoption.”  See 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); accord Access to Courts Hearing, 
supra note 24, at 17–18 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 26, at 117 n.83.  And, the first 
Supreme Court decision interpreting Rule 7(c) was United States v. Debrow, which construed the Rule in line with 
Resendiz-Ponce.  See 346 U.S. 374, 376–78 (1953).  But, before Twombly and Iqbal, there was little need to consider 
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 Second, the intended design of Rule 7(c) meets the applicable standards to serve as a font 
of interpretive guidance.  That design is embodied in the Rule’s text and original Advisory 
Committee Note, both firmly-established bases for interpreting the Criminal Rules.206  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has said that “the ‘traditional tools’ of construction”—which 
apply to the Federal Rules207—include the provision’s history and purpose,208 and courts regularly 
rely on the history of the Criminal Rules and the drafters’ intent in ascertaining the meaning of the 
Rules.209  Furthermore, Rule 7(c)’s text is not patently clear as to the level of detail it requires, so 
resort to a broader set of considerations is warranted and valuable.210 
 Third, nothing eliminates the value of Rule 7(c)’s intended design as an interpretive 
resource.  Had later amendments to the Federal Rules changed the substance of Rule 7(c) or Rule 
8(a), then any anticipated balance between them could have been severed.  But, those Rules have 
 
the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a), and the Court has never done so.  Moreover, the Court’s language 
in Ortiz was countering the idea that it was “free to alter [a Rule] except through the process prescribed by Congress 
in the Rules Enabling Act.”  See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 861–64.  Indeed, Ortiz contained a lengthy discussion of the intent 
of the drafters of the Rule at issue.  See id. at 838–45. 
206 See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013); Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 
(11th Cir. 2005); Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 51 
Hastings L.J. 255, 312 (2000); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1103, 1122, 1161–67 (2002). 
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drafters’ intent and the drafting history in interpreting a Civil Rule); Struve, supra note 206, at 1155–56, 1165–66 
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210 See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir. 2009); cf. Bus. Guides, Inc., 
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not changed meaningfully since their adoption.  Thus, the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 
8(a) should remain as strong as ever. 
 Now, to be sure, Twombly and Iqbal reimagined Rule 8(a).211  But, those decisions made 
clear that, at least by their terms, they were not amending the Rule.  Rather, they purported to 
reject a misconstruction of Rule 8(a) that arose out of a misreading of Conley and restore a proper 
understanding of the Rule.  For example, the Twombly Court explained: 
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show that 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized, and explained 
away long enough.  To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be 
understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete 
allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim 
for relief.  But the passage so often quoted fails to mention this understanding on 
the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous 
observation has earned its retirement.  The phrase is best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has 
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent 
with the allegations in the complaint.  Conley, then, described the breadth of 
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard 
of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.212 
 
The Court also said that its decision aligned “with th[e] Court’s statements in the years since 
Conley” and that appellate decisions from the 1940s that “allegedly gave rise to Conley’s ‘no set 
of facts’ language” “do not challenge the understanding that . . . a complaint must allege facts 
suggestive of illegal conduct.”213  Furthermore, it expressly referenced model complaint Form 9—
discussed more below214—which had accompanied the Civil Rules in effectively the same form 
since their adoption,215 as exemplifying proper pleading.216  And, the Court said that, “[i]n reaching 
[our] conclusion, we do not apply any heightened pleading standard . . . which can only be 
 
211 Cf. Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 18 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (treating Twombly and Iqbal 
as “judicial lawmaking” rather than “interpretation”). 
212 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
213 Id. at 563 n.8. 
214 See infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text. 
215 See Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 9 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 9 (1938). 
216 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
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accomplished by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”217  
Lastly, the Court in Iqbal expressly nested its “new” pleading standard within the historical 
development of Rule 8(a), asserting that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the 
hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery 
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”218  In short, under Twombly and Iqbal, 
the Supreme Court’s pleading standard reflects the original meaning of Rule 8(a)—ostensibly the 
very meaning the drafters of the Criminal Rules intended to link to Rule 7(c). 
 Even if we were to treat Twombly and Iqbal as changing the meaning of Rule 8(a), however, 
that alone should not eliminate the value of Rule 7(c)’s intended design as an interpretive authority.  
The drafters of the Criminal Rules, all distinguished legal minds of their day, would not be 
surprised by the idea that the meaning of legal language could change by way of judicial 
reinterpretation over time.  Accordingly, had the drafters wanted to avoid the possibility of Rule 
7(c) shifting in meaning as a function of Rule 8(a)’s interpretive evolution, they could have made 
Rule 7(c) more static by, inter alia, not adopting historically-charged language, declining to insert 
a cross-reference to Rule 8(a) in the Advisory Committee Note, and/or clarifying that they did not 
want to preserve the traditional civil-criminal pleading balance.  But they did not do any of that.  
Rather, they carefully associated Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) and assumed the risk that Rule 7(c)’s 
meaning would vary along with that of Rule 8(a). 
 In sum, the original design of Rule 7(c) should be dispositive as to the meaning of the Rule.  
It is the strongest source of guidance, an eminently appropriate basis for interpretation, and nothing 
eliminates its interpretive power.  Twombly and Iqbal, therefore, should set the minimum standard 
for indictments. 
 
217 Id. at 569 n.14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
218 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
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IV. Why Counterarguments Are Unpersuasive 
 
 To be sure, there are counterarguments to contend with.  Not only do several naturally 
present themselves, but also courts around the country and the Advisory Committee itself have 
offered legal arguments against altering the prevailing criminal pleading standard.  This Part 
therefore addresses counterarguments anticipated by the author as well as those that have been 
raised by the case law and the Advisory Committee. 
A. Anticipated Counterarguments 
 
This Part begins with two counterarguments that the author views as some of the strongest 
against this Article’s position: (1) that the drafters of Rule 7(c) did not intend to require anything 
like Twombly and Iqbal’s pleading standard; and (2) that Rule 7(c) does not require prosecutors to 
specify the “means” of the crime. 
i. The Drafters of Rule 7(c) Did Not Intend to Impose a Pleading 
Standard Like that of Twombly and Iqbal 
 
The first counterargument is that, even if the drafters of Rule 7(c) meant for the Rule to be 
at least as demanding as Rule 8(a) and could have anticipated some fluctuation in Rule 8(a)’s 
meaning, they did not intend for Rule 7(c) to encompass anything like the pleading standard of 
Twombly and Iqbal.  That is a strong point and is likely true. 
When the Criminal Rules were adopted, they were accompanied by “form indictments” 
meant to illustrate Rule 7(c)’s requirements.219  Those forms did not require much factual detail, 
and they even permitted stating the “facts” in statutory or legalistic language.  For example, the 
form indictment for receiving a stolen motor vehicle read, “On or about the [blank] day of [blank], 
19 [blank], in the [blank] District of [blank], John Doe received and concealed a stolen motor 
 
219 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) advisory committee note; Fed. R. Crim. P. 58 (1946).  The forms have since been abrogated.  
United States v. White, 980 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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vehicle, which was moving as interstate commerce, and he then knew the motor vehicle to have 
been stolen.”220  And, the form indictment for first degree murder on a federal reservation stated, 
“On or about the [blank] day of [blank], 19 [blank], in the [blank] District of [blank], and on lands 
acquired for the use of the United States and under the (exclusive) (concurrent) jurisdiction of the 
United States, John Doe with premeditation shot and murdered John Roe.”221 
 The drafters, moreover, indicated that those types of factually-limited indictments reflected 
their ideal.  During drafting discussions, for instance, Holtzoff said the idea underlying Crane’s 
“statement of facts” language was a “Cropsey” indictment that “would allege that the defendant 
murdered John Smith by a fatal gunshot wound,” and he approved of such indictments.222  Medalie 
made statements to a similar effect.223  Likewise, Holtzoff posited that an indictment would be 
sufficient if it provided that, on a specific date, “the defendant transported certain property, to-wit, 
certain bonds to the value of $6,000 from New York City, State of New York, to the City of 
Washington, District of Columbia, and said property had been stolen, and the defendant knew the 
same to be stolen,” and others seemed to agree.224  Additionally, in discussing the intersection 
between “Cropsey” indictments and the proposed “essential facts” language, Crane asserted: 
You charged a murder in the first degree, “in that with premeditation and 
deliberation,” and so forth.  That constitutes malice.  “That with premeditation and 
deliberation,” those are the words of the statute, “he did kill John Jones on the night 
of so and so.”  Now, “Premeditation and deliberation,” those are facts.  
“Premeditated and intended to kill him and did kill him”--those, are facts, and those 
facts have to be stated.225 
 
 
220 Fed. R. Crim. P. Form 7 (1946). 
221 Fed. R. Crim. P. Form 2 (1946). 
222 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 200–02; January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 249. 
223 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 202–03, 206–07; January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 255. 
224 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 215–17. 
225 January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 249–50 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, in Rule 7(c)’s Advisory Committee Note, the drafters expressly said that “[t]his 
rule introduces a simple form of indictment, illustrated by Forms 1 to 11 in the Appendix of 
Forms.”226  And, the articles cited in the Note generally praised the form indictment for murder or 
used it to demonstrate Rule 7(c)’s meaning.  Holtzoff maintained, for instance, that that 
“indictment sets forth all of the substantive elements of the offense and definitely informs the 
defendant of the specific crime of which he is accused.”227  Vanderbilt, likewise, said that it was 
“an illustration” of “[t]he form preferred by the committee.”228  Finally, Homer Cummings 
proclaimed that the murder indictment “is clear and explicit,” “sets forth every element of the 
offense and accurately acquaints the defendant with the specific crime with which he is charged,” 
and “is a great improvement upon the ancient form.”229 
Nevertheless, the fact that Rule 7(c)’s drafters did not anticipate the Rule embracing the 
Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard does not undercut the force of the foregoing discussion, for 
several reasons. 
First, precisely the same critique can be leveled at Rule 8(a) itself—notwithstanding that 
Twombly and Iqbal interpreted that Rule.230  To start, Rule 8(a) was also illuminated by model 
forms, and those forms, just like the criminal ones, allowed for conclusory and factually-limited 
pleading.231  For instance, the form complaint for goods sold and delivered required the plaintiff 
 
226 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) advisory committee note (emphasis added). 
227 Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 125, 449. 
228 Vanderbilt, supra note 100, at 377. 
229 Cummings, supra note 100, at 655. 
230 Cf. Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 18 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (indicating that Twombly 
and Iqbal rejected “the system of notice pleading that Clark intended, that Congress and the bar were told in 1938 had 
been implemented in the Federal Rules, and that the Supreme Court embraced as early as 1947,” and replaced it with 
a standard “that is hard to distinguish from that which the drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected”); id. at 5 
(Answers to Senator Arlen Specter’s Post-Hearing Questions by Stephen B. Burbank) (“[T]he resulting arbitrary 
distinctions – between ‘facts,’ ‘threadbare allegations,’ and ‘conclusions’ -- are demonstrably inconsistent with a 
fundamental premise of the system of notice pleading that the drafters of the Federal Rules intended to implement in 
1938.”). 
231 Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (1938).  Those forms were initially illustrative, became “sufficient,” and were ultimately 
abrogated.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 & advisory committee note (2020) (abrogated). 
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to plead that “Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for goods sold and delivered by 
plaintiff to defendant between June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.”232  The form complaint for 
conversion, likewise, had the plaintiff allege that, “[o]n or about December 1, 1936, defendant 
converted to his own use ten bonds of the [blank] Company (here insert brief identification as by 
number and issue) of the value of ten thousand dollars, the property of plaintiff.”233  And, the form 
complaint for negligence required the plaintiff to assert, for example, that, “[o]n June 1, 1936, in 
a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a 
motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.”234   
The idea that the model complaints and indictments suggest comparably light anticipated 
pleading standards, moreover, is far from idiosyncratic.  Indeed, Charles Clark, “the ‘principal 
draftsman’ of the [Civil] Rules” and Reporter to the original Civil Rules Advisory Committee,235 
wrote an opinion while serving as a Second Circuit judge in 1956 that treated the form indictment 
for murder and the form complaint for negligence as equivalently general.  In his words: 
There seems to be some tendency to confuse general pleadings with entire absence 
of statement of claim or charge.  But this is a mistake, for general pleadings, far 
from omitting a claim or charge, do convey information to the intelligent and 
sophisticated circle for which they are designed.  Thus the charge that at a certain 
time and place ‘John Doe with premeditation shot and murdered John Roe,’ 
F.R.Cr.P., Form 2, even though of comparatively few words, has made clear the 
offense it is bringing before the court.  [Then, in a footnote:] So also the famous 
Form 9 of the Civil Rules, ‘Complaint for Negligence,’ shows a complete claim for 
damages for personal injuries.236 
 
What is more, the drafters of the Civil Rules broadly indicated that they did not expect Rule 
8(a) to bar pleading conclusions as opposed to facts—in contrast to the interpretation supplied by 
 
232 Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 5 (1938) 
233 Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 11 (1938). 
234 Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 9 (1938). 
235 Campbell, supra note 88, at 10 (citation omitted). 
236 See United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, 317 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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Twombly and Iqbal.  For example, during the drafting process, Advisory Committee member 
George Pepper suggested pleading requirement language that eliminated the word “facts.”237  He 
explained that using that word, or the like, leads to “this endless discussion as to the distinction 
between fact and law” and does not “add[] anything in the way of clarity,” and he suggested not 
requiring pleading “facts” because that was “tried unsuccessfully in the codes, as evidenced by the 
amount of disputation in the cases as to what [words like ‘facts’] mean.”238  And, he later said: 
[I]f you take these distinctions between law and fact, you get involved in all sorts 
of contradictions.  If you are really strictly thinking about it, and are bound by the 
rule that you must state facts and not conclusions of law, or that you must state 
conclusions of law and not facts, you could not draw a libel in divorce, because you 
could not state that the parties had been married.  The statement that they had been 
married is a statement of fact, and it is a statement of a conclusion of law from the 
fact.  There is no end to the subtleties in which you may engage if you undertake to 
make those refinements.239 
  
A motion to adopt Pepper’s language ultimately carried.240 
 
During the discussion of Pepper’s language, moreover, others indicated that that language 
would largely eliminate the distinction between factual and legal allegations.  One member, for 
instance, said that the idea that it is “no longer . . . necessary to state facts” in a pleading “is going 
to be very far-reaching, and a very decided change in pleading in this country.”241  A second argued 
that “you would not get anywhere by using the term ‘facts’ except into the difficulty that we have 
all gotten into in the code states” involving the “impossibility in practice” of “draw[ing] a sharp 
line between facts, conclusions of law and evidence.”242 Another maintained that he supported 
 
237 Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 253, 263, 278, 281–82 (Feb. 1936) [hereinafter February 1936 Hearing], https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes. 
238 Id. at 264. 
239 Id. at 280–81. 
240 Id. at 302. 
241 Id. at 287. 
242 Id. at 294. 
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“relax[ing] the requirements on the pleader” in line with Pepper’s proposal because civil pleading 
rules requiring factual allegations but not legal or evidentiary ones had caused trouble.243 
 Outside the drafting process, but around the time of the Civil Rules’ adoption, Rule 8(a)’s 
drafters also expressed the view that pleading rules should be exceedingly flexible and that alleging 
legal conclusions should be acceptable.244  For example, Clark explained: 
The old requirement that a party must plead only facts, avoiding evidence on the 
one hand and law on the other, was logically indefensible, since the actual 
distinction is at most one of degree only and in actual practice it caused more 
confusion than any possible worth it might have as admonition.  The new rules 
provide only for a short and plain statement of claim or defense showing that the 
party is entitled to the relief claimed or the action of the court desired; and there is 
only the further general admonition that each averment of a pleading shall be set 
forth as simply, concisely, and directly as the circumstances permit.245 
 
He likewise asserted that “[t]here is no fixed and certain rule as to the detail required” for 
pleadings, that the function of pleadings “is only to set the general boundaries of the action and to 
provide the basis for res adjudicata or the binding force of the final judgment to be rendered,” and  
that, “[i]f you need facts about the case before trial from your opponent, you should get them by 
deposition and discovery.”246  And, Clark stated: “Then there is also contemplated a very simple, 
concise system of allegation and defense.  Some lawyers have been quite a little worried for fear 
there was not enough required in the way of detailed pleading, but nevertheless this system calls 
for very brief and direct allegations.”247  Further, he said, in referring to the form complaint for 
 
243 Id. at 299–300. 
244 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
245 Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450 (1936). 
246 Charles E. Clark, The Bar and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure, 25 A.B.A. J. 22, 23 (1939); Clark, supra 
note 96, at 316–17; accord Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Clark, 
supra note 93, at 566–67; Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase – Underlying 
Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976 , 977 (1937). 
247 Clark, supra note 93, at 552. 
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negligence and the sufficiency of a complaint, that a “statement of the act in question in a general 
way, and with a characterization that it is negligent, is sufficient.”248,249 
Similarly, James Moore—Clark’s assistant during the drafting process—maintained, in 
describing the philosophy underlying the Civil Rules: “Litigation is not an art in writing nice 
pleadings.  It can and should seldom be settled on its merits at the pleading stage unless the parties 
are agreed upon the facts and want a quick legal answer.”250  Moore also explained that “[t]he 
pleading rules are designed to . . . reduce the pleading requirements to a minimum,” “make[] 
pleadings relatively unimportant,” and require pleadings that “do little more than sketch the type 
of battle that is to follow.”251 
Several members of the Advisory Committee, moreover, articulated comparable 
sentiments.  One member, for instance, said: 
The reason [that the word “fact” does not appear in Rule 8] is, nobody knows what 
“facts” are; courts have been trying for five hundred years to find “facts” and 
nobody has ever been able to draw a line between what were and what were not 
“facts.”  Since the word “facts” has given a great deal of trouble the suggestion was, 
Why not eliminate it? . . . .  
The real test of a good pleading under the new rules is not, however, 
whether the allegations would be deemed good at common law.  The test is whether 
information is given sufficient to enable the party to plead and to prepare for trial.  
A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it 
gives the proper information.252 
 
That member likewise contended: 
The word “facts” does not appear in the federal rules relating to pleadings, 
for the reason that that term has proved to be a very troublesome one.  There is no 
workable definition of a “fact.”  The proper test of a good allegation should not be 
that it alleges “facts” but that it gives adequate information.  Under the federal rules 
allegations will be deemed sufficient if they supply whatever information is 
 
248 Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (citation omitted).   
249 It has also been observed that “it is difficult to find Twombly’s (let alone Iqbal’s) standards in the relevant work of 
Charles Clark . . . and difficult to separate his views from those of the Advisory Committee.”  Id. at 17. 
250 See Moore, supra note 93, at 560. 
251 Id. at 559, 561. 
252 Sunderland, supra note 94, at 12. 
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necessary to enable the opposite party to plead or to prepare for trial.  The simplicity 
and lack of technicality contemplated in the drawing of pleadings is illustrated by 
the model forms which are attached to the new federal rules as an appendix.  Some 
of the allegations in those forms might be technically designated as conclusions of 
law, rather than facts of the orthodox issuable type, but they fully serve the purpose 
of giving information and are, therefore, considered suitable.253 
 
And, another asserted: 
What these rules do emphasize with respect to the contents of a pleading (as 
the forms in the Appendix show) is that any plain telling of the story that shows 
that the pleader is entitled to relief upon the grounds he states is sufficient to bring 
the pleader’s cause into court.  That the statement or averment includes a conclusion 
of law is no ground for a motion to strike or for a motion to make definite, merely 
because the statement or averment embodies a conclusion which might be 
elaborated by a more particularized detailing of the facts.254 
 
Lastly, a third member, in testifying to Congress about the proposed Civil Rules, explained: 
I want you now to consider this provision in Rule 8, as to what you have to 
put into your paper.  You used to have the requirement that a complaint must allege 
the “facts” constituting the “cause of action.”  I can show you thousands of cases 
that have gone wrong on dialectical, psychological, and technical argument as to 
whether a pleading contained a “cause of action”; and of whether certain allegations 
were allegations of “fact” or were “conclusions of law” or were merely 
“evidentiary” as distinguished from “ultimate” facts.  In these rules there is no 
requirement that the pleader must plead a technically perfect “cause of action” or 
that he must allege “facts” or “ultimate facts.”  [Rule 8 prescribes] the essential 
thing, reduced to its narrowest possible requirement, “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”255 
 
He also testified that “[t]he simplified pleadings provided for . . . give a general view of the 
controversy” and “are supplemented by the provisions for depositions, discovery and pretrial 
practice.”256 
Second, Twombly and Iqbal’s focus on pleading facts rather than conclusions fits much 
better with Rule 7(c) than Rule 8(a).  Unlike the drafters of the Civil Rules, the drafters of the 
 
253 Edson R. Sunderland, The Availability of the New Federal Rules for Use in the State Courts of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 
U.L.J. 143, 145 (1938). 
254 Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 24, at 5 n.10 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (citation omitted). 
255 Id. at 4 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
256 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Criminal Rules did not reject any requirement of pleading “facts.”  Rather, they expressly adopted 
an “essential facts” pleading requirement, invoked code pleading standards that demanded alleging 
“facts,” and did not respond to warnings and commentary about using the word “facts.”   
Beyond that, Rule 7(c)’s drafters emphasized the importance of pleading facts.  Many 
examples of that are set out above, given the Committee’s focus on Crane’s “statement of facts” 
language.257  But there are yet others.  For instance, early in the discussions, Crane said: 
I myself think that we should have a statement of the facts, but I do not like 
to say how the facts should be stated.  There are so many different facts, but when 
you state these facts you know that when they are true that a crime has been 
committed.258 
 
And, later, in discussing New York practice and the proposed “essential facts” language, 
Crane observed: 
We had to use the words.  We had to state the facts.  But the other adjectives 
were all left out, and that was covered by the first sentence, which is- 
 
“plain and concise and definite statement of the essential facts.” 
 
F-a-c-t-s!  Facts are so important to all of us.  We think we always get to 
the law before we get to the facts, but the facts must be stated which constitute an 
offence charged against the accused. 
 
I do not see how you can narrow that, and I do not see how you can enlarge 
upon it.  And, as you know, we have found it worked pretty well.259 
 
 Additionally, even Dession, in arguing for a short-form indictment, said, “I suppose we would all 
agree that before the pleading clearly is finished facts should be set out which cover every 
substantive detail of an offence,” with “the only question” being “in which paper [the facts of the 
offense] must all appear.”260 
 
257 See, e.g., supra notes 149, 152–153, 155, 158–159, 161, 168–169, 176 and accompanying text. 
258 September 1941 Hearing, supra note 139, at 202. 
259 January 1942 Hearing, supra note 167, at 250 (emphasis added). 
260 Id. at 253, 258. 
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 Furthermore, the drafters made similar statements in the articles cited in Rule 7(c)’s 
Advisory Committee Note.  For example, Medalie said that “[i]t is hoped that this new rule will 
lead to the swift abolition of the lengthy, wordy and obscure indictments which obfuscated, rather 
than stated, the facts constituting the crime.”261  Holtzoff, likewise, said that the Committee had 
“deliberately rejected” short-form indictments that do not “specify[] or summariz[e] the facts,” 
and that “[a] simple indictment, briefly and succinctly setting forth the facts of the specific crime, 
seems far preferable.”262 
 In sum, it may be true that Rule 7(c) was not designed to impose anything like the pleading 
standard of Twombly and Iqbal.  But, the same can be said for Rule 8(a).  And, if Twombly and 
Iqbal’s fact-intensive standard has any place at all, it is with Rule 7(c).  So, given that Rule 7(c) 
was designed to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), there is no reason why a pleading standard at 
least as demanding as Twombly and Iqbal should not govern Rule 7(c) today. 
ii. Rule 7(c) Does Not Require Prosecutors to Specify the “Means” of the 
Crime 
  
A second counterargument is that Rule 7(c) allows—and historically allowed—the 
prosecutor to “allege that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown 
or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means,”263 and so the Rule cannot 
demand factual allegations like those required by Twombly and Iqbal.  Although not a weak point, 
it is unpersuasive. 
First, although Twombly and Iqbal, applied in the criminal context, might be limited by 
Rule 7(c)’s “means” provision, that would only be the case when the means are actually unknown.  
 
261 Medalie, supra note 100, at 3. 
262 Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 125–26, 449. 
263 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (1946) (similar). 
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Allowing prosecutors to say that the means are unknown in a particular case is different from 
treating any factually-barren indictment as sufficient. 
Second, essentially the same principle animating the “means” provision applies to Rule 8 
and served as no barrier to Twombly and Iqbal.  Civil Rule 8(e)(2) originally said, in relevant part, 
“A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.”264  Effectively the same statement 
now appears in Civil Rule 8(d)(2).265  And, in explaining Rule 8(e) around the time of its 
promulgation, Clark stated: 
The rules definitely permit a considerable choice to the pleader as to how he shall 
tell his story.  Thus prohibitions developed in certain codes against alternative or 
conditional statements are expressly removed.  If he is not sure of his facts he may 
show what his doubt is so long as he honestly sets forth what he knows.266 
 
In short, like Rule 7(c), Rule 8 accounts for circumstances in which a party lacks knowledge about 
his case and allows him to “show his doubt.”  
 Moreover, the drafters of the Civil Rules indicated that the means of the legal violation did 
not need to be stated.  For example, in discussing the model complaint for negligence, which did 
not require specifying the details—or means—of the negligence at hand, Clark said: 
Now some lawyers have thought that further details should be added.  But details 
will not necessarily paint a truer picture.  They may even mislead. . . . So with our 
form, what can be added with profit?  Defective brakes, lack of headlights, failure 
to keep a lookout, etc.?  It would be nice, indeed, for the plaintiff if the defendant 
would admit any of these things.  And yet it is the plaintiff who is making the 
allegations.  Moreover none of them are primary or ultimate in the sense that even 
if they existed the case would be proven.267 
 
 
264 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (1938). 
265 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). 
266 Clark, supra note 96, at 316 (emphasis added). 
267 Id. at 317. 
57 
 
Hence, Rule 8, like Rule 7(c), was designed to allow one to plead without full knowledge and 
leave “means” unspecified.  Given that Twombly and Iqbal govern Rule 8(a) anyway, Rule 7(c)’s 
“means” provision should serve as no bar to applying a similar pleading standard in criminal cases. 
 Finally, the goal of Rule 7(c)’s “means” provision was not to create any major difference 
between Rule 8 and Rule 7(c).  As the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c) explained: 
The provision . . . that it may be alleged in a single count that the means by which 
the defendant committed the offense are unknown, or that he committed it by one 
or more specified means, is intended to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the 
purpose of alleging the commission of the offense by different means or in different 
ways.  Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e)(2).268   
 
In other words, the “means” provision was designed to prevent the use of multiple counts for 
alleging different ways in which a violation of law might have occurred—just like Rule 8(e)(2) 
allowed—and the drafters tied Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(e)(2) together by way of a cross-reference.  
The Note mentions nothing special about allowing prosecutors to admit when they do not know 
the means.  Consequently, nothing indicates that the “means” provision should affect the interplay 
between Rule 8(a) and Rule 7(c).269 
B. Counterarguments from the Case Law 
 
The next set of counterarguments comes from the case law.  Those counterarguments 
include: (1) that nothing in Twombly and Iqbal suggests those decisions were meant to apply to 
criminal cases; (2) that a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of an indictment must 
establish prejudice to prevail; (3) that a criminal defendant can obtain a bill of particulars; (4) that 
Rule 8(a) requires a “showing” of entitlement to relief, whereas Rule 7(c) does not; (5) that Rule 
 
268 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) advisory committee note. 
269 In fact, the drafters of Rule 7(c) thought the Civil Rules did more than the Criminal Rules in this context.  Holtzoff 
said, for instance: “Lots of people thought there was going to be uproar against the provision in the Civil Rules that 
you can have alternative allegations and hypothetical allegations.  Of course, we are not going to suggest hypothetical 
allegations for an indictment, I suppose, but the Civil Rules go further and they permit both hypothetical and 
alternative.”  March-April 1942 Hearing, supra note 168, at 296–97. 
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7(c) was designed to eliminate technicalities; and (6) that criminal procedure and civil procedure 
are simply different.  
i. Nothing in Twombly or Iqbal Suggests They Were Meant to Apply to 
Criminal Cases 
 
 The first argument from the case law is that nothing in Twombly and Iqbal indicates that 
those decisions were meant to apply to criminal cases.270  That argument is unpersuasive, however, 
for two reasons.  First, the drafters of Rule 7(c) meant the Rule to be at least as stringent as Rule 
8(a), meaning that the Supreme Court did not need to discuss criminal cases for a reinterpretation 
of Rule 8(a) to require a reinterpretation of Rule 7(c).  Second, because Twombly and Iqbal were 
civil cases and the connection between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) was not fully fleshed out until now, 
the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the implications of reinterpreting Rule 8(a) for 
criminal cases. 
ii. A Defendant Challenging an Indictment Must Establish Prejudice to 
Prevail 
  
 The second case law argument is that the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard is inappropriate 
in the criminal context because a defendant challenging an indictment must establish prejudice to 
prevail.271  But that argument, too, is unavailing. 
 Tracing that argument back through the cases cited to support it,272 it is based on a federal 
statute passed in 1872, which stated: 
No indictment . . . shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or 
other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in 
matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant.273 
 
 
270 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
272 See United States v. Castillo Madrigal, No. 12-cr-62, 2013 WL 12099089, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2013); United 
States v. Castaldi, 547 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); Hagner v. United 
States, 285 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1932). 
273 Hagner, 285 U.S. at 431–32. 
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There also existed a similar statute that applied to civil and criminal cases and which provided: 
 
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in 
any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of 
the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or 
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.274 
 
Those statutes were repealed in 1948.275  But, their substance was retained in Criminal Rule 
52(a),276 which says that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”277   
 The Civil Rules contain a similar “harmless error” provision.  Under Rule 61:  
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence--or 
any other error by the court or a party--is ground for granting a new trial, for setting 
aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and 
defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.278 
 
 Not only are Rule 61 and Rule 52(a) linguistically similar, but also they share the same 
lineage and are inextricably intertwined.  Rule 61 was designed as a combination of the second 
harmless error statute referenced above (the one applicable to civil cases) and another similar 
statute for civil cases, with unspecified modifications.279  Additionally, the original Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 52(a) stated that “[a] similar provision is found in rule 61 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”280  And, Lester Orfield, one of the drafters of the Criminal Rules, 
explained shortly after the adoption of Rule 52(a) that the Rule “really amounts to a shortened 
form of the second sentence of Civil Rule 61.”281 
 
274 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) advisory committee note. 
275 United States v. Williams, 203 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1953). 
276 Id.; Fed R. Crim P. 52(a) advisory committee note.  
277 Fed R. Crim P. 52(a).  Rule 52(a) remains essentially the same as when originally adopted.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a) (1946). 
278 Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.  Rule 61 remains essentially the same as when originally adopted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (1938). 
279 Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 advisory committee note; see also Mims v. Reid, 275 F.177, 178–79 (4th Cir. 1921) (reciting 
the similar civil statute). 
280 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) advisory committee note. 
281 See Lester B. Orfield, Two Years of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 Temp. L.Q. 46, 60 n.271 (1948). 
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 Federal courts have also repeatedly concluded that Rule 61 is effectively the same as Rule 
52(a).  For example, the Fifth Circuit observed that “Civil Rule 61 combines in a single rule the 
harmless and plain error rules stated in Criminal Rule 52(a) and (b).”282  Likewise, the Third Circuit 
said that it “d[id] not perceive a clear distinction between the two” Rules.283  And courts 
consistently cite the Rules interchangeably or as imposing essentially the same requirements.284  
Indeed, if anything, Rule 61 is treated as less forgiving than Rule 52(a).285 
 Furthermore, Rule 61 applies to pleadings.  As explained in Federal Practice and 
Procedure on Rule 61, “[t]echnical errors in pleading usually are treated as harmless and 
disregarded.”286  Courts have invoked Rule 61 in or connected it to the pleading context as well.287 
 In sum, the basis for the “prejudice” argument is “harmless error,” which applies to both 
civil and criminal procedure and to civil pleadings.  Accordingly, that argument does not counter 
the view that Rule 7(c) should be at least as demanding as Rule 8(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
282 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996). 
283 McQueeny v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 779 F.2d 916, 927 n.17 (3d Cir. 1985). 
284 See, e.g., O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 441 (1995); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 & n.5 (1967); 
United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2018); Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 
(2000); Friends of Keesville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230, 234 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988); CalMat Co. v. Oldcastle Precast, 
Inc., Civ. No. 16-26, 2018 WL 3025053, at *2 (D.N.M. June 21, 2018); Creter v. Arvonio, Civ. A. No. 92-4493, 1993 
WL 306425, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 1993). 
285 See, e.g., McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 925; Miller et al., supra note 87, § 2883. 
286 Miller et al., supra note 87, § 2884. 
287 See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc., v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990); Dye Constr. Co. v. 
OSHA, 698 F.2d 423, 425 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983); McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 766 (1st Cir. 1951); 
Rawls v. Paradise Artists, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-417, 2019 WL 7482142, at *4 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2019); Griesinger 
v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:13-cv-808, 2016 WL 2349112, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2016); Capital Mach. Co. v. 
Miller Veneers, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-702, 2012 WL 243563, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2012); Spencer Cty. Redev. 
Comm’n v. AK Steel Corp., No. 3:09-cv-66, 2011 WL 3806947, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2011); Aretakis v. 
Durivage, No. 1:07-CV-1273, 2009 WL 2567781, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009); Foote v. Barnhart, No. 3:06-686, 
2008 WL 2756256, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. July 15, 2008); IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Pub’g, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-5221, 
2005 WL 3544335, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2005); Mioduszewska v. Bd. of Educ., No. 93 CIV. 3843, 1993 WL 564902, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1993); Courtney v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401, 402 (D. Wyo. 1974). 
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iii. A Defendant Can Obtain a Bill of Particulars 
 
 The third argument from the case law is that Twombly and Iqbal should not be applied to 
criminal cases because a defendant who wants more detail about his case may seek a bill of 
particulars.288  But that argument fails too. 
 First, the drafters of Rule 7(c) designed the Rule to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), 
despite authorizing bills of particulars.289  Thus, the existence of that mechanism should not 
undermine the intent of the drafters. 
 Second, the drafters designed the Rule to avoid the need for bills of particulars.  Indeed, 
they specifically rejected short-form indictments to achieve that result.290  Consequently, relying 
on bills of particulars to treat Rule 7(c) as less demanding than Rule 8(a) would be a particularly 
egregious deviation from the drafters’ design. 
 Third, bills of particulars have a very limited role in modern practice.  Courts have often 
concluded that the test for whether a bill of particulars should be granted is essentially the same as 
for whether an indictment is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and/or that a bare-bones 
indictment is enough to obviate the need for a bill of particulars.291  And, they have observed that 
“[m]otions for bills of particulars are seldom employed in modern federal practice.”292  
Accordingly, and in line with the drafters’ original design, bills of particulars are not an effective 
mechanism for obtaining information beyond that provided in the indictment.  Thus, they cannot 
be used persuasively to argue that more detail should not be included in an indictment. 
 
288 See supra note 58 and accompanying text; Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). 
289 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) (1946). 
290 See supra notes 136, 176–189 and accompanying text. 
291 See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 203 
(3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Belardo-Quinones, 71 F.3d 941, 943–44 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Levine, 983 
F.2d 165, 166–67 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 302 (9th Cir. 1977). 
292 See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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 Finally, the Civil Rules have their own “bill of particulars”-like mechanism: the motion for 
a more definite statement.  That motion allows a party to seek “a more definite statement of a 
pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a 
response.”293  And, Clark did not think such motions should be often granted.294  Given that both 
the Civil and Criminal Rules contain similar mechanisms for obtaining additional information 
about the opposing party’s case, the availability of bills of particulars is no basis for treating Rule 
7(c) as less stringent than Rule 8(a).295 
iv. Rule 8(a) Requires a “Showing” of Entitlement to Relief, Whereas Rule 
7(c) Does Not 
 
 The fourth case law argument is that Rule 8(a) is more demanding than Rule 7(c) because 
Rule 8(a) requires a “showing” that the pleader is entitled to relief, whereas Rule 7(c) does not.296 
 It is true that Twombly said that its pleading standard “reflects the threshold requirement of 
Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled 
to relief’” and that “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion of 
 
293 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 
294 See Clark, supra note 93, at 566. 
295 When the Civil Rules were originally promulgated, they also referenced bills of particulars.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(e) (1938) (“[A] party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not 
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to 
prepare for trial.”).  That reference was quickly eliminated because parties used bills of particulars to try to avoid the 
discovery rules—which courts prohibited—and “commentators, judges and members of the bar” expressed criticism.  
Preuss v. Todd, 31 F.R.D. 584, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). 
Those efforts at avoiding the discovery rules occurred, it seems, because, before the Civil Rules, motions for 
a more definite statement were used to remedy defects in pleadings and bills of particulars were used “in aid of the 
trial . . . after issue joined.”  United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 1 F.R.D. 205, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); McKenna 
v. U.S. Lines, 26 F. Supp. 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).  Under the Civil Rules, however, bills of particulars and motions 
for a more definite statement were treated the same, to clarify the pleadings and not to ascertain evidence or proof.  
Byers v. Olander, 7 F.R.D. 745, 746 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Schine Chain Theatres, 1 F.R.D. at 207–08; McElwain v. 
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 1 F.R.D. 177, 177–78 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); McKenna, 26 F. Supp. at 559; Sharp v. Pa.-
Reading Seashore Lines, 1 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D.N.J. 1939); Alexander Holtzoff, Twelve Months Under the New Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 26 A.B.A. J. 45, 47 (1940).  Since the Criminal Rules took effect, criminal bills of particulars have 
been used in the same manner.  See, e.g., United States v. Perryman, 881 F. Supp. 2d 427, 430–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
United States v. Rosenberg, 10 F.R.D. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).  Thus, bills of particulars in criminal cases were and 
are effectively the same as motions for a more definite statement in civil cases, and the reference to bills of particulars 
in the original Civil Rules does not change the foregoing discussion. 
296 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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entitlement to relief,” devoid of factual adornment.297  But, Rule 8(a) contained the “showing” of 
entitlement to relief language at the time Rule 7(c) was crafted, meaning that the drafters of Rule 
7(c) were fully aware of it when they created the Rule and determined its relationship to Rule 
8(a).298  Moreover,  Rule 7(c) adopted the code pleading language that Rule 8(a) had repudiated to 
liberalize pleading and eliminate the problems of alleging only “facts.”  In short, the language of 
Rule 8(a) does not undermine the foregoing analysis. 
v. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Eliminate Technicalities 
  
 The fifth argument that appears in the case law is that Rule 7(c) was designed to eliminate 
technicalities and ensure procedural simplicity.299  Although that is true, the drafters of Rule 7(c) 
used Rule 8(a) as a model of the simplicity they wanted to achieve, and Rule 8(a) seems to have 
simplified pleadings more than Rule 7(c).  And, Rule 7(c)’s drafters did not decide to simplify 
pleadings at all costs.  Rather, they eschewed short-form indictments and sought to promote 
defendants’ rights. 
vi. Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure Are Different 
  
 Finally, courts maintain that Twombly and Iqbal should not apply to indictments because 
criminal procedure and civil procedure are fundamentally different, for example, with respect to 
discovery burdens and the constitutional protections defendants receive.300  However, the drafters 
of Rule 7(c) designed the Rule to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), and they did so in perspective 
of the Civil Rules’ discovery provisions and the Constitution.  Differences between civil and 
criminal procedure might well support amending the Criminal Rules to divorce Rule 7(c) and Rule 
8(a), but they cannot justify the pleading standard dichotomy as it stands. 
 
297 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3, 557 (alteration in original). 
298 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1938). 
299 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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C. Counterarguments from the Advisory Committee 
 
 The final set of counterarguments comes from the Advisory Committee’s decision to reject 
Burnham’s 2016 proposal to strengthen the criminal pleading standard.  The Committee offered 
three main legal arguments for doing so: (1) that courts uphold bare-bones indictments; (2) that 
minimal pleading is hundreds of years old and raising the criminal pleading standard would be a 
return to the common law; and (3) that raising the pleading standard would create new substantive 
rights.  
i. Courts Uphold Bare-Bones Indictments  
 
 The Committee’s first argument was that criminal pleading practices are set by appellate 
decisions that uphold bare-bones indictments.301  But pleading requirements are actually set by the 
Criminal Rules, which are then interpreted by courts.302  Thus, saying that the criminal pleading 
standard should not change because appellate decisions have upheld bare-bones indictments puts 
the cart before the horse and, in any event, fails to account for the original design of Rule 7(c), 
which shows that court decisions interpreting Rule 7(c) should be rethought. 
ii. Minimal Pleading Is Hundreds of Years Old and Raising the Criminal 
Pleading Standard Would Be a Return to the Common Law 
 
 The second Committee argument was “that minimal pleading in criminal cases is hundreds 
of years old” and that aligning the criminal and civil pleading standards would operate as a “return 
to the old common law pleading rules.”303  That argument is odd because it is inconsistent; if 
minimal pleading is hundreds of years old, then minimal pleading must have been the style of 
 
301 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
302 Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (“[W]e do not apply any heightened pleading 
standard . . . which can only be accomplished by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
interpretation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
303 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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pleading authorized at common law that the argument fears a return to.  But, putting that 
inconsistency aside, the argument is also unavailing. 
 As a threshold matter, the argument is unconvincing in a broad sense simply because the 
drafters of the Criminal Rules intended Rule 7(c) to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a), and Rule 
8(a) now requires more than minimal pleading.  More specifically, however, there are two 
additional reasons why it fails. 
 First, the point that minimal pleading is hundreds of years old seems to be channeling the 
accurate proposition that indictments drawn in statutory language have long been held sufficient—
at least subject to the qualification that the statutory language must sufficiently apprise the 
defendant of the allegations against her.304  But, arguments against rethinking the criminal pleading 
standard based on that ignore the historical balance between criminal and civil pleading standards 
that treated criminal pleading standards as at least as stringent as civil ones. 
 That balance, as explained previously, was well established before the Criminal Rules.  
And, in line with it, courts often indicated that the rule allowing indictments to employ statutory 
language applied to non-criminal cases.  For instance, in 1907, the Circuit Court for the District of 
Massachusetts said that, with respect to a civil action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, “it is not 
sufficient to frame the declaration in the words of the statute” because “[t]he statute does not set 
forth the elements of the offenses which are forbidden,” and, to support that conclusion, it quoted 
 
304 See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83–84 (1908); United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 
612–13 (1881); United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1877); Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583, 584 (4th 
Cir. 1926); United States v. Burns, 54 F. 351, 360–61 (C.C.D. W. Va. 1893); United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 32, 
32 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1879) (No. 15, 257); United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 978, 980 (C.C.D. Mich. 1853) (No. 
16,234); Grattan v. State, 71 Ala. 344, 345 (1882); State v. Brown, 4 Port. 410, 413 (1837); Caldwell v. State, 83 S.W. 
929, 929–30 (Ark. 1904); People v. Ward, 42 P. 894, 895 (Cal. 1895); State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1902); 
State v. Brandt, 41 Iowa 593, 607–08 (1875); Commonwealth v. Black, 20 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Ky. 1929); 
Commonwealth v. Stout, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 247, 249 (1847); State v. Munsey, 96 A. 729, 729–30 (Me. 1916); State 
v. Burke, 52 S.W. 226, 227–28 (Mo. 1899); Jordan v. State, 3 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tenn. 1928); Richardson v. Fletcher, 
52 A. 1064, 1068 (Vt. 1902); State v. Martin, 162 P. 356, 358 (Wash. 1917); State v. Parkersburg Brewing Co., 45 
S.E. 924, 925 (W. Va. 1903). 
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a criminal case under the Act holding that the Act “is not one of the class where it is always 
sufficient to declare in the words of the enactment, as it does not set forth all the elements of a 
crime.”305  Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in 1919, said: “In criminal pleading, where 
the statute creates an offense and sets out the facts which constitute it, an information that follows 
the language of the statute is good.  The same rule of pleading should, and does, apply in civil 
actions.”306  There are myriad similar examples.307  Thus, if minimal pleading in criminal cases is 
hundreds of years old, so too is it in civil cases.  Yet that served as no bar to Twombly and Iqbal. 
 Furthermore, the Federal Rules did not change the traditional balance between civil and 
criminal pleading standards.  As set out above, the drafters of Rule 7(c) did not intend to upset that 
balance and wanted the Rule to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a).  And, the drafters of Rule 8(a) 
sought to minimize pleading requirements and were largely comfortable with conclusory pleading. 
Indeed, the traditional civil-criminal pleading balance even appeared regularly in the case 
law after the Federal Rules became effective.  Before Iqbal, courts and jurists commonly invoked 
 
305 Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 152 F. 726, 728–29 (C.C.D. Mass. 1907). 
306 Patrick v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 181 P. 611, 612 (Kan. 1919) (citation omitted). 
307 See, e.g., United States v. 385 Barrels, etc., of Wine, 300 F. 565, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); United States v. Or. Short 
Line Ry. Co., 180 F. 483, 484 (D. Idaho 1908); Smith v. Witcher, 60 So. 391, 392 (Ala. 1912); St. Louis & S. F. R. 
Co. v. Phillips, 51 So. 638, 641 (Ala. 1910); Cotton v. Holloway, 12 So. 172, 174 (Ala. 1892); Hollenbacher v. Bryant, 
30 A.2d 561, 562–63 (Del. Super. Ct. 1943); Lynam v. Hastings, 185 A. 91, 91–92 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936); O’Brien v. 
Wilmington Provision Co., 148 A. 294, 295 (Del. Super. Ct. 1929); Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Spreckels, 13 Haw. 527, 
530 (1901); Patten, 64 N.E. at 851; Latshaw v. State ex rel. Latshaw, 59 N.E. 471, 474 (Ind. 1901); Bloom v. Franklin 
Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 479–80 (1884); Blanchard-Hamilton Furniture Co. v. Colvin, 69 N.E. 1032, 1034 (Ind. 
App. Ct. 1904); Burkart v. City of Newport, 97 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Ky. 1936); City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 31 S.W. 
1045, 1048 (Mo. 1895); City of Louisiana v. Anderson, 73 S.W. 875, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903); Canham v. Bruegman, 
109 N.W. 733, 734 (Neb. 1906); Crooks v. People’s Nat’l Bank, 61 N.Y.S. 604, 607–08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899); 
Dickenson v. Henderson, 176 P. 797, 798 (Or. 1918); Utah Ass’n of Creditmen v. Boyle Furniture Co., 136 P. 572, 
573 (Utah 1913); Richardson, 52 A. at 1068; Selvey v. Grafton Coal & Coke Co., 79 S.E. 656, 657 (W. Va. 1913); 
State v. Zillman, 98 N.W. 543, 545 (Wis. 1904); Jarvis v. Hamilton, 16 Wis. 574, 577–78 (1863); Blatchley v. Adair, 
5 Iowa 545, 546 (1858); accord Morris M. Estee & Carter P. Pomeroy, Estee’s Pleadings, Practice and Forms, Adapted 
to Actions and Special Proceedings under Codes of Civil Procedure § 827 (3d ed. 1886); Francis Hilliard, Law of 
Remedies for Torts, including Replevin, Real Action, Pleading, Evidence, Damages 237, 236 n.a (2d ed. 1873); 3 
William A. Sutherland, Treatise on Code Pleading and Practice Also Containing 1900 Forms Adapted to Practice in 
California, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Other Code States § 5028 (1910). see also Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Stone, 80 F.2d 483, 
484 (3d Cir. 1935) (applying the statutory language rule to bankruptcy cases); Meek v. Beezer, 28 F.2d 343, 346 (3d 
Cir. 1928) (same); In re Bellah, 116 F. 69, 71–76 (D. Del. 1902) (same). 
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the idea that criminal pleadings should be at least as detailed as civil ones.308,309  For example, in 
2008, the Eastern District of Michigan explained that, “[l]ike a civil complaint’s ‘notice pleading’ 
requirement, a criminal indictment is sufficient if it ‘contains the elements of the offense charged 
and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend.’”310  Likewise, in 2007, 
the Western District of Missouri concluded: 
The pleading requirements in criminal cases go beyond the “notice 
pleading” that is adequate in civil litigation.  Rule 7(c)(1) of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires “definite” allegations of “facts” constituting the offense 
charged.  While evidentiary details need not be pleaded, the “essential facts” cannot 
be omitted.  Conclusory legalistic pleading will not suffice.  Often the law is 
sufficiently factual in its articulation to allow use of statutory language, but the 
defendant is entitled to know, quite definitely, what she is accused of doing.311 
 
And, in 1953, the Eastern District of Arkansas said that, because “it is not necessary for [an] 
indictment to allege” certain matters, “a fortiori such a requirement should not be made in a civil 
case.”312,313 
 
308 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1311 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Barkett, J., concurring); 
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1266 n.11 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring); United States v. Staggs, 
881 F.2d 1527, 1543–44 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Ebel, J., dissenting); Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 766 (2d 
Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting); United States v. O’Connor, No. 89 CR 152, 1989 WL 50888, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
28, 1989); Brantley v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 710 F. Supp. 135, 141 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Bradford v. Moench, 670 F. 
Supp. 920, 929 n.12 (D. Utah 1987); Myers v. Rosenberg, No. 83 C 1342, 1985 WL 585, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 
1985); United States v. Scheur, Criminal No. 05-304, 2007 WL 1063301, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2007); see also 
United States v. Chagra, 638 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (applying the Conley pleading standard to an 
indictment). 
309 To be sure, views were not uniform.  See, e.g., Staggs, 881 F.2d at 1532 n.6; United States v. Mavroules, 819 F. 
Supp. 1109, 1118–19 (D. Mass. 1993); United States v. Marchese, No. 89 Cr. 229, 1991 WL 60338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 11, 1991); Richard A. Brown, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Proscription against 
Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 804, 827 (1972).  But the point is that the traditional civil-
criminal pleading balance did not disappear under the Federal Rules. 
310 United States v. Hammoud, 556 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715–16 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citations omitted). 
311 United States v. Zwego, No. 7-7-CR, 2007 WL 1289687, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 1, 2007). 
312 Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 802, 815 (E.D. Ark. 1953). 
313 The traditional civil-criminal pleading balance has even appeared, in a sense, in post-Twombly-Iqbal decisions, as 
some courts have questioned the flipped pleading balance that prevails today.  See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, __ 
F. Supp. 3d __, 2019 WL 7049954, at *1–2 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2019); United States v. Bibbs, No. 15 CR 578, 2016 
WL 4701441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2016); United States v. Novak, No. 13 CR 312, 2014 WL 2937062, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. June 30, 2014); United States v. Adcox, Criminal Action No. 15-36, 2017 WL 2489998, at *4 (W.D. La. June 7, 
2017); United States v. Diallo, No. 9 CR 858, 2009 WL 4277163, at *2 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2009). 
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 In short, although indictments have long been permitted to use statutory language, that rule 
historically applied to civil pleadings, it existed comfortably alongside and as part of the traditional 
civil-criminal pleading balance, and the Federal Rules did not upset that traditional balance.  
Hence, it is not a basis for subjecting criminal pleadings to less scrutiny than civil ones. 
Second, aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards would not be a return to common 
law criminal pleading unless Twombly and Iqbal required that.  But, they do not.  The type of 
common law indictments the drafters of Rule 7(c) eschewed looked something like this:   
In the District Court of the United States within and for the [blank] Division 
of the District of [blank] sitting at the City of [blank], State of [blank], at the [blank], 
19 [blank] term of said court. 
The grand jurors of the United States in and for the District and Division 
aforesaid, duly empaneled, sworn, and charged, at the term aforesaid, by the court 
aforesaid, on their oaths, find, charge, and present that on or about the [blank] day 
of [blank], 19 [blank], at and in the City of [blank], in [blank] County, State of 
[blank], and upon land purchased and acquired by the United States of America for 
a United States Post Office and a United States Courthouse building, the real estate 
on which such building rests, being otherwise described as lots numbered [blank], 
on [blank] Street, all as disclosed by the recorded plat of the original town site of 
the City of [blank], [blank] County, State of [blank], and the said real estate and 
building thereon being under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States of 
America, the same having been purchased and acquired by the United States for 
such Post Office and Courthouse purposes by the consent of the Legislature of, and 
the laws of the State of [blank] for the erection of such needful buildings of the 
United States, and such buildings and real estate being in the [blank] Division of 
the District of [blank], and within the jurisdiction of this court, one A.B. and one 
C.D. did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, purposely, deliberately, 
premeditatedly, feloniously, of their malice aforethought, and with the intent so to 
do, kill and murder X.Y., a human being, the said murder being perpetrated in the 
manner and form herein set forth by the said A.B. and C.D., then and there holding 
in their respective hands certain respective pistols, revolvers and small firearms, 
loaded with powder and leaden steel and metallic bullets, a more exact description 
of which firearms and bullets being to the grand jury unknown, and which said 
firearms so held respectively by the said defendants, A.B. and C.D., they, and each 
of them, fired, shot and discharged at, towards, against and into the body, abdomen, 
chest, and limbs of the said X.Y., thereby mortally wounding him, the said X.Y.; 
all of which the said A.B. and C.D. did with the wilful, unlawful, deliberate, 
premeditated and felonious intent aforesaid, and with malice aforethought, as 
aforesaid, to kill and murder and take the life of him the said X.Y.; and that the said 
X.Y. from the effect of said bullets and the mortal wounds inflicted thereby did 
69 
 
languish, and languishing did die on or about the [blank] day of April, 19 [blank]; 
all contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against 
the peace and dignity of the United States of America.314 
 
Twombly and Iqbal demand nothing of that sort. 
 Moreover, those decisions simply purported to restore the original meaning of Rule 8(a).  
Rule 8(a), in turn, was designed to impose a lighter pleading standard than code pleading, which 
was itself designed to repudiate the technicality, complexity, and opacity of common law pleading.  
Thus, Twombly and Iqbal should be viewed as imposing the lightest pleading standard of all—one 
less rigid and technical than common law pleading and less fact-bound than code pleading—
especially given the traditional civil-criminal pleading balance.  In other words, Twombly and Iqbal 
are a far cry from common law indictments.315 
iii. Raising the Criminal Pleading Standard Would Create New 
Substantive Rights 
 
The Committee’s final argument was that raising the criminal pleading standard would 
“create new substantive rights, which is beyond the authority of the Rules Committee.”316  That 
argument is unconvincing, however, given that the original design of Rule 7(c) complies with the 
longstanding principle that criminal pleading requirements should be at least as strict as civil ones.  
Additionally, Twombly and Iqbal imposed their pleading standard in the civil context without 
“creating substantive rights,” so it is unclear why aligning the civil and criminal pleading standards 
 
314 Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 124–25, 488. 
315 As noted above, the drafters of Rule 8(a) did draw on the common law in so far as it allowed for pleading little 
factual detail.  See supra note 96.  But, flexibility in averment is not what the drafters of Rule 7(c) were trying to 
escape.  See, e.g., Holtzoff, supra note 100, at 124, 448 (“The prolix and archaic form of indictment couched in 
Elizabethan English is still used in the federal courts.  Actually, instead of apprizing the defendant of the crime of 
which he is accused, an indictment of this sort tends to mystify him.  Moreover, much useless and laborious learning 
has been accumulated and an incalculable amount of midnight oil burned over the futile problem of how an indictment 
should be drawn and what it should contain.”); Medalie, supra note 100, at 2 (“Prevailing forms of federal indictments, 
evolved after years of litigation over technical defects, represent anything but a clear and simple statement of the facts 
constituting the crime.  The need to guard against microscopic technical flaws had resulted in a plethora of logomachy 
in which lurked, well hidden, the substance of the offense.”). 
316 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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and restoring the original and traditional balance between those standards would do so.  
Furthermore, given that Twombly and Iqbal simply purported to restore the original meaning of 
Rule 8(a), which was designed to make the civil pleading standard less stringent than code 
pleading, it is hard to imagine how applying the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard to Rule 7(c), 
which contains code pleading language, would create rights.  Lastly, it cannot be the case that 
aligning Rule 7(c) with Rule 8(a) would create substantive rights simply because the Constitution 
provides for indictments, notice to the accused, and due process.317  If that were so, every Federal 
Rule that afforded more procedural protection than the constitutional minimum would be 
invalid.318 
V. Conclusion  
Under our current pleading regime, a civil plaintiff must allege sufficient factual matter to 
state a plausible claim to relief and cannot merely present legal conclusions, but a prosecutor can 
plead using broadly-worded statutory language.  In other words, civil pleadings are held to much 
more stringent requirements than criminal ones.  That balance between civil and criminal pleading 
standards, however, is plainly unjustified.  Rule 7(c) was designed to require at least as much detail 
as Rule 8(a), and that original design should govern Rule 7(c) today.  
The conclusion is a serious one.  It undermines a deeply-entrenched relationship between 
criminal and civil pleadings that has been accepted by the highest authorities in the land, and it 
calls for those authorities to seriously rethink their positions.  It also means that criminal defendants 
should receive substantially more information at the outset of prosecutions and possess a greater 
opportunity for challenging the case against them before trial than they currently do.  And, it shows 
 
317 See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1962); cf., e.g., United States v. Anderson, 280 F.3d 1121, 
1124 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the minimum constitutional requirements for an indictment). 
318 Cf., e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (noting that a Criminal Rule violation was not a 
constitutional violation); United States v. Fry, 831 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1987) (same). 
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that policy debates over whether the criminal pleading standard should be changed are being 
fought in the wrong posture.  The onus to prove that the criminal pleading standard should be 
different should be on those arguing that that standard should be weaker than the civil standard, 
not on those urging that those standards should be aligned.  Those in the latter group, despite lag 
in authoritative interpretation, are already right. 
